

The Tailings of Canadian Politics: The North-South Political Divide

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Regionalism continues to be a central concern of scholars of Canadian politics. Most scholars focus on Western alienation, Quebec separatism, or Atlantic economic disparities. Yet little attention has been given to the North-South political cleavages within provinces.¹ The concerns of residents over land claims in northern British Columbia and the transportation of garbage to Kirkland Lake from Toronto, to cite but two examples, suggest the existence of a distinctly northern provincial identity. This paper argues that there is clear evidence that residents across Canada's provincial Norths see themselves as distinct from the larger provincial political communities of which they are a part. Moreover, we suggest the residents of the provincial Norths have commonalities in their political perceptions and responses to important policy issues.

Our paper begins with a discussion of the relationship among culture, institutions, and internal colonialism as factors in the development of regional political identity and a brief outline of the issues of northern identity in scholarship on the North. We then illustrate through three cases—gun control and the related bear hunting moratoriums, health care, and economic development—that policies designed in the provincial South are framed within a very different set of beliefs, values, and attitudes than in the provincial North. Clearly, the outcomes of these policy decisions have very different impacts in the provincial Norths because of these disparate beliefs and values. Northerners often feel treated like mining tailings simply exploited and abandoned. The paper draws substantially on newspaper articles and editorials, which are important records of the views of elites and ordinary citizens alike, especially in local and regional communities. While neither claiming that northern identity is singular across the provincial Norths, nor that it is homogeneous within each respective province, we do claim that there are distinct differences between life in the provincial North and life in the provincial South and that these differences are the basis for extant North-South political cleavages. Moreover, we also argue that whatever term academics use to describe the North-South re-

lationship (i.e., heartland-hinterland, urban-rural, centre-periphery), the fact is that people who live in the provincial Norths consider themselves northerners. In other words, perception matters. As David Bell argues, "Indeed, what people believe is true probably plays a greater part than what really is true in determining the nature and extent of [regional] conflict."² Finally, we suggest that the provincial Norths are political communities in transition, creating their own institutions to build northern heartlands.

Before we begin our discussion of political identity in the provincial Norths, we start with a caution. Long-time scholar of the Canadian North, Ken Coates, observes that scholarship on the North is limited first by an ingrained exceptionalism, the belief that the North lies "outside the realm of traditional conceptual frameworks."³ Second, scholarship on the North is limited in whatever conceptual and theoretical frameworks are brought to bear on the North; they tend to be drawn uncritically from southern models and experiences with little reference to the realities of the North. Furthermore they tend to focus on the "North's relationship with other districts, and therefore do not emphasize North-centred questions."⁴ As a corrective, Coates suggests that northern scholarship requires comparative analysis, both across regions of the North and with other remote areas, northern or not, as well as theoretical frameworks generated from problems within the North itself. As we draw on the existing literature on political identity and regionalism, we heed this caution.

The Changing Form of Regionalism

Regional and ethnoregional identity politics enjoys a rich set of literatures.⁵ For the purposes of this paper, we would like to identify some key elements of the literatures that may have bearing on the study of northern political identity. First, we draw on David Bell's work to illustrate the importance of the recognition of culture to the development of region. Then we look to Michael Hechter's concept of internal colonialism to demonstrate the sense of deprivation felt by the provincial Norths that can arise because the decision-making institutions are not situated in the region. Third, we look at the work of Michael Keating, and particularly at his discussion of the evolution of regionalism and of how globalization has created a new antagonist, for the assertion of regional consciousness.

David Bell, in his study of Canadian political culture, argues that cultural identity can exist without there being a concomitant political manifestation of that identity. When regionalism, as a political ideology arises, individuals feel some sense that they are not being treated equally by the other cultures (even though one can assume that there may be distinct beliefs, values and attitudes existing among peoples living within the same

borders). Cultural markers, for example values about language, religion, economies and life style, can produce divisions within a society or between societies. These divisions are known as cleavages. Bell writes,

Multiple reinforcing cleavages do not invariably produce conflict. Cleavages are necessary for conflict to occur, but conflict also requires an awareness of the cleavages and a sense that regional inequalities are unjust. Like other 'isms', regionalism is cultural, based on a sense of deprivation relative to others. One cannot discuss the political side of regionalism without attending to the beliefs, values, and attitudes prevailing in a region. Only when this cultural factor, this regional awareness, is present—at least among the elite—does a region take on political, and not merely economic or geographical significance.⁶

This suggests that, although a cultural identity may exist because people share a particular way of life, it is institutional factors that can foster a political response when that way of life is placed at risk by the decisions made by others. This is evident when one sees how policy devised in the provincial South affects people living a different way of life in the provincial Norths.

At the core of regionalism is often the sense—real or perceived—that a larger political community treats its constituent parts as internal colonies. Internal colonialism can be any combination of cultural, economic, and political. In this regard, Michael Hechter's seminal work, *Internal Colonialism*,⁷ remains an important source of ideas on which to build a framework to analyze North-South relations in the Canadian provinces. In his study of the Celtic peripheries of Britain, Hechter challenges structural and cultural diffusion theories, which propose that peripheral regions inevitably assimilate into the institutions and values of the dominant metropolis. He finds that, instead of assimilation, regional ethnic mobilization occurs on the peripheries. Hechter argues that internal colonialism and an attendant cultural division of labour explain ethnic mobilization. Internal colonialism involves a centre exploiting its regional peripheries. Where these regions are also culturally defined, we have a cultural division of labour. In Great Britain, for example, primary industries, such as coal mining, were located in Wales whereas tertiary industries, such as skilled industrial production, were centred in England. This led to a situation where England disproportionately benefited economically at the expense of Wales. The economic disparities led to a rise in Welsh nationalism.

While neither detailing his whole argument nor accepting wholesale the import of his framework to the study of the provincial Norths, we wish to draw on a number of key elements of his description of internal colonialism that seem applicable. Commerce and trade among members of the periphery tend to be monopolized by members of the core. Historically, a peripheral economy is forced into development complementary to the core, and thus becomes dependent on external markets. Generally, this econo-

my rests on a single primary export. Typically there is great migration and mobility of peripheral workers in response to price fluctuations of exported primary products, leading to boom-and-bust economies. There is a relative lack of services and a lower standard of living in the peripheries and a higher level of frustration among members of the peripheral group.⁸

Following on this model of internal colonialism, Hechter offers three hypotheses on the political integration of peripheral communities into the dominant state and society: (1) the greater the economic inequalities between the core and the periphery, the greater the solidarity of the periphery and its resistance to political integration; (2) the greater the frequency of intra-collectivity communication, the greater the solidarity of the peripheral collectivity; and (3) the greater the intergroup differences of culture (between centre and periphery), the greater the solidarity of the peripheral collectivity.⁹

The politics of internal colonialism poses a challenge for political integration. But, as Hechter argues, this challenge "relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core, but to a malintegration established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate."¹⁰ The solution, he argues, is "best served by strengthening the political power of the peripheral group so that it may change the distribution of resources to its greater advantage."¹¹ One solution is building, from below, political, social, and economic institutions that better address the needs and aspirations of peripheral regions. Another solution is the devolution of power from core to regions. Both of these processes may lead to peripheral regions redefining themselves as heartlands.

Whether perceived or real, a number of these features of internal colonialism girder regionalism in the provincial Norths across Canada. Again, as David Bell argues,

Regional alienation is not founded on economic disparity alone, but on disparity seen through a cultural lens that lines up the facts in a particular way. More recent research have [sic] clarified the extent of regionalism in Canada's mass political culture. Two considerations are key: the extent of regional identification, the perception of regional injustice. Not surprisingly, the question of identification revolves around provincial rather than regional loyalties, and is typically phrased with explicit reference to government.¹²

Michael Keating's work picks up the idea that the state (government) is the singular antagonist in traditional explanations of the rise of regionalism. He argues that regionalism emerges from both the top-down and from the bottom-up. Either the state invites the regions to participate in national strategies (often discovering that the "regional preferences and priorities are not always consistent with those of government"¹³) or the regions themselves force regional interests onto the agenda. There are

at least three reasons why regions push their agendas. One, identified as "defensive regionalism," which is "tied to traditional economic sectors and threatened communities...committed to resisting change"; two, "integrating regionalism, which [seeks] to modernize the region with the aim of re-inserting it into the national economy but without making claims for continued regional distinctiveness or cultural promotion"; and three, "autonomist regionalism, which [seeks] to construct a distinct path to modernization on a programme which could combine autonomy, cultural promotion and economic modernization."¹⁴ In all cases, the state is the main antagonist in the regional conflict and precipitates alienation. Keating goes on to argue that there is now a new antagonist in regional politics. In this new regionalism, globalization, he contends, has focussed the state's attention away from the dealing with regional issues.¹⁵ The new state focus tends to be toward international markets and global integration. As a result, regions have also changed and their focus often extends beyond the state. Numerous scholars view globalization as either creating a new antagonist for the regions or as a new opportunity for regions to participate more directly in their own future.¹⁶ What Keating notes is that there are at least three essential elements to regional self-determination: institutions, resources and civil society.¹⁷

The provincial Norths find themselves in an interesting position in this debate about the shifting focus of regionalism. They are, of course, regions within regions. The province building that has been going on since Confederation means that the provincial Norths, and particularly the resources of the communities found there, have been part of the strategy of building autonomous provinces with sufficient resources to assert themselves against the federal antagonist. As was demonstrated above, most of the discussion of regionalism in Canada has been focussed on the East-West divide. In any case, the idea of internal colonialism is particularly relevant to the provincial Norths because they see their resources and their communities exploited for the development of the large urban centres and their populations.¹⁸ British Columbia's political culture is a particularly good example of how divergent views have shaped northern and rural identities so clearly different from those of the southern and urban centres. The influences of British colonialism, so apparent in Victoria, stand in stark contrast to the individualism of the province's interior. Canada's provincial Norths struggle with the differentiation of political cultures within their respective provinces with the sense of a relative lack of response as a result of electoral arrangements, with disparate populations and with the lack of services.

Globalization issues are exaggerated for the provincial Norths because they do not have control over their resources. Their ability to compete as

new regions is made more difficult because they are bound by the provincial borders and, therefore, by the initiatives of province building. Mary Louise McAllister demonstrates this in her study of the varied success of northern communities in Ontario in participating in broad policy communities.¹⁹

In the next section of this article, we look at some of the literature that helps to define the unique culture of the provincial Norths.

A Northern Identity and a Distinct Way of Life in the Provincial North

Exploration of the defining features of the North and northern identity is not new. Pioneering scholarship by Morris Zaslow and Louis-Edmond Hamelin, on the North in general, and by Geoffrey Weller, on the provincial North in particular, stand out as prominent examples.²⁰ A survey of literature and scholarly research on northern identity by David Heinemann reveals the extensive range of conceptions that exist about the "Northern identity."²¹ These multifaceted conceptions are important because they speak to North-South divides that are not simply rural-urban or heartland-hinterland divisions. Heinemann finds that the first wave of northern identification came with the expression of a Canada of the North, when, in other words, the whole country was perceived as northern. The "second, conflicting sense of Northernness" is the idea of "North-of-country." He suggests that there is "disagreement ... but little commentary" on the location of Canada's North although many seem to connect it to the Arctic and the territories.²² In fact, he argues, there is a tendency to ignore "the North" in discussions of Canada's regions. A preference is usually given to the idea of the "Atlantic, Central, Prairie, and Pacific" regions.²³ Where "the North" ends up in the discussion is often of little relevance to the overall working of the country.

One scholar who has devoted much inquiry to the place of the North within the overall workings of Canada is Ken Coates. For Coates, the question of northern identity is pivotal. In his article "Discovery of the North," Coates identifies no fewer than nine different definitions of the North: outsiders' definitions, geographical constructs, spatial constructs, social-cultural definitions, economic determinism, climatic considerations, political structures, evolutionary concepts, and North as a state of mind. Social-cultural definitions of the North, for instance, address one common reality of northern societies, the relations among Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous settlers, though these relations are hardly unique to northern areas. Economic determinism focusses on the resource-based economies of many northern regions, but this reality is changing for some northern areas. However, it is his last definition of the North—the North as a state of mind—that is in search of scholarship:

Northerners' sense of themselves and their region—has attracted little scholarly work. Ironically, this may well be the most important area of analysis, for as with any concept of region or of belonging to an identifiable group or area, self-definition is a vitally important characteristic. Whatever definition of the North is finally settled upon, must, therefore include a strong consideration of how the region views itself.²⁴

As we shall see, residents of Canada's provincial Norths see themselves as northerners living in regions considered by the South to be the periphery or the hinterland. Culturally, many northerners maintain ways of life distinct from those in the South. This is manifested casually in recreational pursuits and in active community life, and sharply over issues such as gun control and hunting. Socially, the availability of services—health care, transportation, and so on—is usually poorer than in the South and represents a major source of grievance with the South. Economically, there is greater dependency on limited primary resource industries, whether it be mining, forestry, or fisheries, than in the South, with the concomitant migration of workers and populations as the markets rise and fall. Because the North often contributes greatly to the larger economies, there is a real sense among northerners that they do not have political efficacy within their respective provincial polities. The North, however, is in transition. Across many of the provincial Norths, elites and citizens are making demands on provincial governments and creating institutions from below that are redefining northern hinterlands as northern heartlands.

Three Cases: Gun Control and the Grizzly Bear Moratorium, Health Care and Issues of Political Economy

The three cases on which we have chosen to focus—gun control and bear moratoriums, health care, and economic development—cut across provincial boundaries and appeared repeatedly in our examination of articles and editorials in newspapers across the provincial Norths.²⁵ Among these articles, one item describes the northern perception of gun control and the grizzly bear hunt moratorium, the health care crisis and the problem of infrastructure in a way that an academic never would. In a letter to the editor, Dana Giesbrecht writes:

So our almighty Premier stands above the masses of BC and sweeps his mighty sceptre across this vast green land of ours and declares to all who anticipate—"Let there be a three year moratorium on the Grizzly Bear Hunt!"

The masses of the south begin to murmur and nod their green-woolen-toqued heads in agreement at what a grand idea this is. As they stroll back to their SUVs (which are pointed in the direction of suburban bliss), they hand out their bumper stickers to legalize hemp.

Meanwhile the northerners, with puzzled faces, limp home on their

unpaved roads, armed only with their Leathermans (their rifles were taken away months ago), keeping an eye open for that extra grizzly bear.

For if that grizzly decides to make them his snack of the day, they can only hope he does during clinic hours: Monday to Friday, not during lunch, and hopefully (keep your fingers crossed, gang!) there is a doctor on call or a doctor in town at all.²⁶

The sentiments expressed in this letter to the editor capture the North-South divide in Canada's provincial Norths. The policy issues below illustrate further this extant northern political identity. It will become evident that northerners perceive different responses and outcomes from the South for some of the most important policy issues that affect them.

Cultures Apart: Gun Control and the Moratorium on Hunting Bears in Ontario and British Columbia

Perhaps the most insidious kind of public policy changes that upset northern residents are those that do not adequately take into account the real impacts of a southern perspective on northern communities and on their livelihoods. Many in the North see the federal gun control legislation as a tax grab and, more insidiously, a moral statement on the way northerners live their lives. In both Ontario and British Columbia, the impact of a moratorium on hunting bears has been seen as political rather than scientific. It has deeply affected the hunting industry and left many outfitters distressed at the loss of jobs and angry at the politicization of their industry.

Two sentiments seem to be prevalent in newspapers across the North: the first is that gun registration is a policy that responds to special interests in the Canadian South. This is expressed well in an editorial entitled "Don't Forget Who Wants to Register Your Guns" in the Manitoba Thompson Citizen. The editorial urged northern Manitobans to remember the Liberal gun registry at voting time. It said,

In northern Manitoba, guns are a necessary part of daily life for many people. Many of our aboriginal residents still hunt food for their families. Without wild game, many families would go hungry. Each animal does not care whether he is shot with a registered or unregistered rifle! Neither does anyone who is likely to be the victim of gun violence. The Liberals don't have the courage to try to ban guns, yet. This will be the next step after they register all firearms. They must satisfy the urban voters in eastern Canada where pressure groups are demanding gun control. Ontario has the most Liberal seats and their votes are mostly urban. They fear guns in the cities, so the Liberals are going with a full gun control legislation package.²⁷

The second sentiment expressed was frustration over the damage the registry would cause tourism in the North. An editorial in the Northern Daily News began

It seems it wasn't enough for the Canadian government to make life miserable for the hunters and recreational gun owners in Canada. Now it plans to make life more difficult for the U.S. hunters.... Now, all visitors who do not have a Canadian firearms license will need to report their firearms at the border, complete a non-resident firearms declaration form in triplicate, have it confirmed by a customs officer and pay a \$50 (Canadian) fee. Isn't that wonderful.²⁸

To exacerbate the situation for northern communities, both Ontario and British Columbia imposed moratoriums on bear hunts. On February 8, 2001 the then-NDP government of British Columbia announced a three-year moratorium on the grizzly bear hunt. The moratorium was seen as a purely political ploy to appease the environmental supporters of the NDP. With the loss of their core labour support, and with the Green Party on their tail, the NDP was seen by some northerners to "[sell] out rural B.C. for urban (green) votes."²⁹ David Zirnhelt, NDP MLA for Cariboo South (who lost his seat in the 2001 provincial election to Liberal Walter Cobb where the vote was 8,840 to 3,643) conceded in a speech to a number of hunting guides, that he "lost [presumably within caucus] on the grizzly bear moratorium." His apology did not appease the anger of Doug Walker of the BC Wildlife Federation who said, "This isn't about how many grizzly bears there are, this is about politics."³⁰

The anger expressed by these individuals was directed at what they believed to be a fundamental misunderstanding about the way outfitters and guides care for the environment and the wildlife and, most importantly, about how they earn a living:

"We have had political-free wildlife management in this province up until the election of this government," said Ray Demarchi, retired Chief of Wildlife for the Province of B.C. He said millions of dollars in lost revenue for the period of the ban, by guides, outfitters, taxidermists, lodge owners, et cetera will not be compensated or recovered later.³¹

Indeed, "Ontario outfitters were estimated to have lost close to \$45 million when in January 1999 the Canadian government banned the Ontario spring bear hunt."³² Outdoor Life magazine reported that "out of that loss rose [sic] the Canadian Outdoor Heritage Alliance (COHA), a nonprofit organization that in less than a year has come to represent more than a quarter of a million Canadians who are members of forty-two outdoor associations."³³ Ontario responded to that lobby with a promise made on May 2, 2001 in a twenty-one-step action plan to "introduce a Heritage Hunting and Fishing Act to recognize the important role hunting and fishing play in many Ontario communities."³⁴ But this was seen as too little too late by hunters forced to register their guns and by business operators stalled by what they saw as opportunistic policy making.

By 2003, the revelation that the gun registry had become a bureau-

cratic nightmare as well as a financial debacle gave more fuel to the argument that the gun registry was acting as denouncement of particular kinds of values rather than a real attempt to curb criminal activity. In January 2003, protesters went to Parliament Hill with guns in hand in defiance of the law. When key cultural markers were attacked, northerners responded and many participated in numerous protests:

UNDER BILL C-68, the Firearms Act, all Canadian gunowners were supposed to register their weapons or declare their intent to do so by midnight, Dec. 31. Too bad the National Gun Registry couldn't handle the pressure. In the days leading up to the deadline, its telephones often went unanswered and its Web site failed under heavy demand. Now, as many as two million guns remain unregistered, and the registry, which was to cost \$2 million to create, will now require \$1 billion to become operational.

Many opponents of the legislation have simply refused to register. Last week, some 200 people gathered on Parliament Hill to protest against the registry, which they say will never function properly and contravenes their constitutional rights. "It's time we said, 'We're not afraid,'" declared Jim Turnbull, the head of the Canadian Unregistered Firearms Owners Association. "Canadian citizens are made criminals just because of a piece of paper."³⁵

The sentiments around gun control in the North remain a contentious issue today because many northerners feel that their way of life is being criminalized.

Health Care—The Crisis

The crisis in northern health care is dramatic. Most often the question in the North is not whether an individual can get in to see a particular surgeon or specialist but whether there is a surgeon or specialist in the region at all. Across the provincial Norths there is a consistency of issues that are discussed, primarily issues of retention, recruitment and training. In Thompson, Manitoba the headlines read, "Government Plans to Train and Keep Doctors"; "Difficulties of Attraction and Retaining Professionals" and "Rural MDs Unhappy." In Sudbury, Ontario they read, "Doctors: Tired of Waiting for Province;" "Harris must Move to End Health-care Apartheid." In northern British Columbia the headlines were, "Study to Look at Nurse Retention"; "48 Docs Show Interest in P.G." These headlines illustrate the frustration felt by health care workers in the North as well as the desire of communities to respond to the problem themselves.

Some northern communities are recognizing that the only way to ensure that there are health care workers in the North is to train those workers in the North. This made-in-the-North solution has led to at least two initiatives to create a northern medical school. Dr. Jim Rouke (a doctor from Ontario attending a British Columbia Northern Medical Program

workshop) argued that “we’re trying to map out a program to expand the number of medical students educated, get more admitted from the rural areas and make sure they get trained in those areas.”³⁶

Northern Ontario achieved a medical school in 2001 but did so in a climate of opposition.³⁷ After the McKendry Report in December 1999, which looked at solutions to the northern medical crisis, one editorial commented that there existed a fundamental misunderstanding in southern Ontario, and particularly in medical school administrations in southern Ontario, about the pursuit of a northern medical school. The editorial reads,

It is sad to see the interests of southern Ontario medical schools being placed before the interests of the medical needs of northerners.... Since the recommendation [to create a northern medical school] was first made public last spring, southern Ontario medical schools have been lobbying the panel saying that any additional medical school seats should be added to their schools and not used to create a new school in the North....

In lobbying for these additional spaces, southern Ontario universities ignore the crux of the McKendry Report to look for ways to help northern and rural areas attract and retain more doctors. To be sure, the establishment of a northern medical school will benefit Laurentian and Lakehead universities and northern communities, but these are secondary considerations. Improving the quality of health care in the North is the paramount concern.³⁸

Ultimately, the panel recommended a satellite medical school that “would be controlled by medical schools in Southern Ontario ... [but] the financial and programming decisions [would] be made by northerners.”³⁹

Many editorials, letters to the editor and articles responded to the need for a northern medical school in the North. Jean Watters, writing as a guest columnist in the Sudbury Star, said,

the arguments for the establishment for such a school are on our side. The dialogue goes well beyond the shortage of medical personnel in Northern Ontario, well beyond the fact that more than 30,000 people in the Sudbury region alone do not have a family doctor. Shortages of decent medical services are a fact of life in most rural and northern areas in Canada.⁴⁰

But Watter’s argument was not driven so much by the local need as by the logic of having a school in the North. Watters adds,

governments will look at more efficient ways to deliver medical and health services in rural and Northern areas to an aging population, which will become less and less mobile. Northern Ontario is the ideal “laboratory” for development, research and innovation in health related areas [because it has] a huge territory, a well-educated population, a large number of post-secondary institutions at the college and university levels, as well as municipal governments (especially Sudbury), all of which have long recognized the potential impact of good technological and communications infrastructures for the

future economic development of our Northern region.⁴¹

This same logic was applied to the situation in northern British Columbia. A health care rally in Prince George in June 2000 led to collaboration between the University of British Columbia (UBC) and the University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) and the creation of a northern medical program whose first intake of students began in 2004.

The issue for both of these schools was not just to train more doctors in the North, so that they understand the problems of health care in the North (where health is generally poorer), but also to train doctors in the North so they understand the lifestyles of northerners while they are still in residence. This speaks clearly to issues of retention and is another reason to ensure that doctors are trained in the North. A recent recruitment campaign recognized that both lifestyle and signing bonuses were major factors attracting doctors to the North.⁴²

Obviously, health care is an essential human service, but it is also essential to sustainable and viable communities. People in the provincial Norths recognize that in order to attract people to their communities they must have this infrastructure in place. If the North is to build itself into a heartland, health care will be a core attractor and northern medical schools would be the tool to help communities train and keep doctors.

Economic Development: The Political Economy of Internal Colonialism

Policy decisions by the South that affect the well-being of northerners, whether they are gun control and hunting moratoriums or health care, reinforce North-South cleavages. The North-South cleavage is further aggravated by the northern belief that Southerners benefit from the wealth produced by northern communities without an appropriately corresponding reinvestment in the economic and social infrastructure of the North. As Coates and Morrison observe, "the Northern regions of the provinces have been rendered into internal colonies, their resources deemed to be available primarily for non-Natives in the South, and with comparatively little thought to the long-term prospects of northern society."⁴³

Although there are no clear figures that demonstrate the percentage of provincial GDPs generated in the provincial Norths, the following figures are revealing. In Ontario, forestry remains a large industry, forest reserves are almost exclusively located in the North. Domestically, the forest products industry provides some 90,000 jobs in northern and southern Ontario and more than forty communities, primarily in the North, are dependent on the forest products industry.⁴⁴ Externally, the forest industry is also important. According to the Ontario government, in "1996, the forest products industry shipped approximately \$12.2 billion worth of forest products. Wood products industries accounted for \$3.4 billion while paper and allied

industries amounted to \$8.8 billion. In addition, the sale of forest products abroad is important to the province's balance of trade. In 1996, the value of forest products exports, primarily to the United States, is estimated to be \$7.3 billion.⁴⁵ In British Columbia, forestry is also an important source of revenue for the provincial coffers, accounting for \$1,392,100,000 of government revenue in 1999-2000.⁴⁶ Forestry, however, is a province-wide industry and it is difficult to estimate the North's share of that contribution. If we compare the contribution of oil and gas to the province in the same period, a resource found almost exclusively in the northeast of the province, we find they contributed \$669,700,000 to government revenues—almost half that contributed by forestry.⁴⁷ Further, if we examine per capita income and government flows, we find that the average net provincial taxes paid (taxes paid minus transfer payments received, for example, Employment Insurance, Old Age Security and Canadian Pension Plan Benefits, Family Allowances and Child Tax Credits) in 1996 was \$581. However, it was \$1,286 in the Cariboo, \$1,053 in the North Coast, \$1,118 in the Nechako, and \$1,557 in the Northeast.⁴⁸

Northerners are aware of the wealth historically generated in the North. If the sentiment "no taxation without representation" were applied across the provinces, one begins to get a sense for at least some of the North's alienation. At an all-candidates meeting in northern Alberta during the last provincial election, for example, it was reported that a "lack of government spending compared to billions the same governments collect from resources like oil and gas taken from the region, emerged as a theme of the two-hour meeting."⁴⁹ One candidate at the meeting, running for the Alberta First Party, declared the "redneck Conservative government is exploiting the North."⁵⁰ The theme of the contributions of the provincial Norths also emerged during the last Federal election. Northern Ontario MP, Ray Bonin, arguing that programs such as FedNor, which provides funding for northern economic development, were justified, stated "this country was built on the backs of people from northern Ontario and northern provinces."⁵¹

Northerners understand the importance of having a voice where decisions are made that affect their economic futures. Commenting on the ministerial appointment of Alberta MLA, Pearl Calahasen, to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Gerry Allaire, mayor of Slave Lake, stated that, "with Mike Cardinal as Minister of Resource Development, a lot of the development in the North is going to be controlled by northerners; that's a positive development."⁵² In a similar vein, Maynard Sonntag, MLA for Meadow Lake, Alberta, commenting on receiving the post of Minister Responsible for the Crown Investments Corporation, in addition to his portfolio of Energy and Mines, said, "I think it bodes well for the area to have someone from a northern, rural community to have two major

portfolios."⁵³ Political representation, however, does not exist only in provincial cabinets. Initiatives at the local level are also viewed as essential. An example of these initiatives is the creation of the Northern Forest Diversification Centre at Keewatin Community College in The Pas, Manitoba. Noting the important role of the Centre in facilitating economic development in northern Manitoba, the Thompson Citizen stated, "Decisions made by the senior levels of government often do not recognize the needs of northern communities. Now, northerners are demanding a greater role in development. By forming strategic alliances they can do just that."⁵⁴ How much influence any single cabinet minister has or how effective any committee or initiative is are debatable matters. Northerners, however, expect representation. They no longer accept the status of internal colonies.

Heartland to Heartland: Changing the Relationship Between the North and South

The three case studies discussed here help to illustrate that people in the provincial Norths have a clear identity that is expressed in both cultural and regional terms. The provincial Norths are not simply branch plants of the South with a few First Nations communities dotting the landscape and where non-Native migrants from the South work for a couple of years before returning home. The provincial Norths are societies intertwined with, but distinct from, larger provincial polities. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal residents of the North have a stake in the future, as this is their home. There is a cultural divide between North and South, as the gun control and bear hunting moratoriums illustrate. Regional grievances, especially economic ones, further deepen this divide. There is little reason to believe that this northern political identity and the political cleavage it generates with the South are likely to disappear.

The provincial Norths, however, are political communities in transition. The contest of different lifestyles based on different beliefs, values, and attitudes has mobilized political action in the North and the provincial Norths are embarking on the process of creating northern heartlands. It would be a mistake to see northern political identity as one simply translated into political grievances. Rather, it is an identity that is also driving the creation of institutions in the provincial Norths that will provide critical foundations for northern communities. It is not merely that northerners grieve the need for more doctors: they also demand the creation of northern medical schools to ensure that doctors will be trained in "the North, by the North, for the North." It will be, as Michael Keating argued, those communities that are able to strengthen their control over resources, galvanize their social capital and build their own institutions that will be able to take advantage of the new regionalism. And, in this process, hinterlands may be-

come northern heartlands and no longer the tailings of Provincial Souths.

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Endnotes

1. This is not to say the provincial North has not been the subject of scholarly inquiry. See Geoffrey R. Weller, "Managing Canada's North: The Case of the Provincial North," *Canadian Public Administration*, 27 (2) (Summer 1984): 197-209; Ken Coates and William R. Morrison, *The Forgotten North: A History of Canada's Provincial Norths* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1992); Morris Zaslow, *The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Morris Zaslow, *The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971); Louis-Edmond Hamelin, ed., "Managing Canada's North: Challenges and Opportunities," *Public Administration*, 27 (2) (1984): 141-252; Louis-Edmond Hamelin, *Canadian Nordicity: It's Your North, Too*, William Barr, trans. (Montreal: Harvest House, 1979).
2. David V.J. Bell, *The Roots of Disunity: A Study of Canadian Political Culture* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992): 142.
3. Ken Coates, "The Discovery of the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Northern/Remote Regions," in *The Northern Review*, No. 12/13 (Summer 1994/Winter 1995), 15-43: 16.
4. Ken Coates, "The Discovery of the North," 17.
5. Mildred A. Schwartz. *Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974.
6. Bell, *The Roots of Disunity*, 142, 128.
7. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
8. *Ibid.*, 33.
9. *Ibid.*, 43.
10. *Ibid.*, 34.
11. *Ibid.*
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15. *Ibid.*, 24.
 16. This is reflected in a series of essays that appear in Roger Epp and Dave Whitson, eds., *Writing Off the Rural West: Globalization, and the Transformation of Rural Communities* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2001). It also is reflected in Mary Louise McAllister, "Grounding Environmental Policy: Rural and Remote Communities in Canada," in Debora L. VanNijnatten and Robert Boardman, eds., *Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases*, second edition (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002): 233-252; and Sir George Quigley, "Perspectives on Regional Inequalities and Regional Growth," in Trevor C. Salmon and Michael Keating, eds., *The Dynamics of Decentralization: Canadian Federalism and British Devolution* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 163-174.
 17. Keating. "Political Economy of Regionalism," 35-39.
 18. See David Baxter and Andrew Ramlo, *Resource Dependency: The Spatial Origins of British Columbia's Economic Base* (Vancouver: Urban Futures Institute, 2002). This report is available in pdf format under the "Knowledge and Insight" link at the Urban Futures web site: <<http://www.urbanfutures.com>>.
 19. McAllister, "Grounding Environmental Policy," 233-252.
 20. See Weller, "Managing Canada's North"; Coates and Morrison, *The Forgotten North*; Morris Zaslow, *Opening of the Canadian North and The Northward Expansion of Canada*; and Louis-Edmond Hamelin, "Managing Canada's North" and *Canadian Nordicity*.
 21. David Heinemann, "Latitude Rising: Historical Continuity in Canadian Nordicity," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 28 (3) (1993): 135.
 22. *Ibid.*
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