Canada’s *Tous Azimuts* Arctic Foreign Policy

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**Abstract:** Through visits across the Circumpolar North and other non-Arctic states, Canada’s foreign affairs minister, Lawrence Cannon, embarked on an international crusade in recent years to promote Canada as an “Arctic Power.” With anticipated increased human activities throughout the Arctic, Ottawa’s discourse for the region is locked in a traditional narrative shaped by a belief that it has to promote Canadian territorial integrity in its Far North. This approach certainly supports a very monolithic nationalistic view of Arctic geopolitics for Canadians. In an emerging “new North” with multiple actors and stakeholders (non-Arctic states, international organizations, Indigenous partners, tourism, fishing, traditional security concerns, and oil & gas exploration and investments), where is Canada going? This article looks at Canada’s current foreign policy discourse when dealing with the Arctic. It argues that the policy objectives put forward under the Harper government produce a *tous azimuts* self-assertive foreign policy discourse driven by undefined and uncalculated strategic outcomes. Therefore, it is advanced that Canada’s lack of vision on global Arctic affairs beyond its territory could potentially undermine Ottawa’s credibility as a multilateralist.

“For if there is one lesson that the biting cold and the dark winters of the Arctic should teach us, it is that no one survives alone out there for long.”

**Introduction**

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has acknowledged that the “geopolitical importance of the Arctic” and Canada’s interest in it have never been greater.” Indeed, retreating sea ice and the anticipated increased human activity in various regions of the Circumpolar North are transforming the many traditional and non-traditional security dimensions of the Arctic. On the domestic level some states, like Canada,
are (inconveniently) required to reassess their respective national security strategies in order to reflect the changes taking place. On the international level, geopolitical settings are evolving in many ways. Two specific challenges could have direct implications for foreign affairs policymakers.

First, as unprecedented security concerns emerge for all circumpolar states (coastal and non-coastal), the importance of effective and sustainable regional co-operation and governance must be stressed. In places like the North American Arctic, retreating summer ice could have significant impacts on that underdeveloped northern “neighbourhood” where the lack of security infrastructures, weak safety regulations, and uncoordinated bilateral or multilateral surveillance could have devastating consequences on state interests and local inhabitants. Elsewhere, as in the Barents Euro-Arctic region, where different types of established institutions, infrastructures, and communications mechanisms support transborder economic activities and development, security concerns are also unavoidable.

The second major challenge caused by climate change relates mostly to the relationships between the Arctic and the rest of the world. If some states (e.g., Germany, France, China, Spain) or international institutions (e.g., European Union, NATO) outside the circumpolar region are increasingly vocal about their various interests in Arctic affairs, diplomatic issues will necessarily appear, meaning increased dialogue and collaboration between Arctic and non-Arctic states. While some states are less equipped than others to cope with economic changes in the Arctic, others are eager to discover all the potential of an internationalized neighbourhood where legitimate state and non-governmental interests need to be addressed. Here, a better understanding of the complex relationships between globalization, national interests, and the changing circumpolar world is emphasized.

Indeed, the predictable transformations brought by climate change are pushing states to re-evaluate their preparedness to deal with many new security challenges in their respective geopolitical and geo-economic settings. For Canada, this process underlines an obstacle that has historically framed its Arctic discourse: the Canadian Far North is an expansive, expensive, and distant territory where Ottawa has very limited capabilities (resources and mobility) to deal with evolving security issues. Consequently, Ottawa’s northern foreign policy discourse has traditionally been the promotion of Canada’s Arctic territorial integrity. This has not changed.
At the same time, reaching out to the Circumpolar World in the past has strategically reinforced Canada's Arctic identity, both domestically and internationally, reinforcing its legitimacy as an Arctic actor. Thus, by creating the Arctic Council in the 1990s, Ottawa made a pragmatic step, showing strong leadership and vision in bringing Canada closer to its circumpolar neighbours and allies. As geopolitics shifted at the end of the Cold War, building bridges between Arctic states gave Canada a clear international diplomatic role. Ottawa is now confronted with another major shift where calculated pragmatism should be guiding its foreign policy. So the question is raised: where is Canada going?

This article looks at Canada's current foreign policy discourse when dealing with the Arctic. It argues that the policy objectives put forward under the Harper government\(^{15}\) by Canada's Northern Strategy (2008-2009) and the Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy (2010) correspond to a continued Canadian internationalist approach in the Arctic (indeed the world) since the end of the Cold War.\(^{16}\) Yet, faced with upcoming challenges associated with Ottawa's distant relationship(s) with its Far North (and with the circumpolar High North), Canada is also producing a \textit{tous azimuts}\(^{1}\) self-assertive foreign policy discourse driven by undefined and uncalculated strategic outcomes.\(^{17}\) In that process, while trying to seek a desired reinforced leadership role in the Arctic that would benefit its national interest and reduce its perceived vulnerability, Canada is rather constructing through a nationalist rhetoric some political ambiguities amongst its allies and creating a sombre image of Arctic geopolitics for Canadians. Therefore, it is argued that unless Canada clearly defines and communicates what it strategically wishes to achieve as a circumpolar leader (i.e., pragmatic diplomatic outcomes), its lack of vision on Arctic affairs could potentially undermine Ottawa's international credibility as a multilateralist.\(^{18}\)

\textbf{Arctic “Power” Geopolitics}

Since 2009, Canada has labelled itself as a “great Arctic power” in an “emerging region” where the “potential of the North is of growing interest to Canada, to other Arctic states and, increasingly, to others far from the region itself.”\(^{19}\) Consequently, Canada's foreign affairs minister, Lawrence Cannon, describes Canada as a leading state—or a “major” Arctic power by virtue of geography—\(^{20}\) that influences “the international community to remain concentrated on the difficulties and possibilities that are present in the Arctic.”\(^{21}\) This geopolitical discourse creates a relationship between geography, state territoriality, and state power\(^{22}\) where the Arctic
is identified as an idiosyncratic space for Canada. The narrative process produces metaphors and constructs images of what Arctic geopolitics are for Canada (geopolitical vision) and how Canada will pursue its legitimate domestic and international responsibilities as an Arctic sovereign state and a major global actor (foreign policy).23

Hence, Canada’s Arctic geopolitical discourse has traditionally been shaped by domestic concerns related to Canada’s geography or territorial integrity in the Arctic.24 In fact, from Bernier’s flag planting claims in the Eastern Arctic Archipelago between 1906–1911,25 to the apprehensions created for Canadians by joint Canada-US military operations (or co-operation) in the Great North throughout the Second World War,26 and the controversy around the first US-flagged Manhattan voyage through the Northwest Passage in 1969,27 successive governments have maintained that “exercising sovereignty on the Canadian North, as well as on the rest of Canada, is a top foreign-policy priority for Canada.”28 Today, 130 years after Great Britain’s transfer of all “the islands above the mainland to Canada in 1880,”29 and as Arctic sea ice recedes in the summertime—generating images of greater human activity in the North—Canada is “sending a clear message [that it] is in control of its Arctic lands and waters and takes its stewardship role and responsibilities seriously.”30 However, what are the next steps to integrate Canada in the High North?

Indeed, that message of control, stewardship, and responsibility is today aligned with general alertness of climate change impacts in the Arctic and the Canadian North. The perceptions fueled by the “climate change process” are reshaping the way Canada looks at its “Far North” territory (vulnerability), reads evolving national interests in the region (security), and speaks to other Arctic and non-Arctic actors (foreign policy).

Accordingly, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s discourse is designed to reduce any perceived vulnerability by Canadians, enhance Arctic security awareness in Canada, and remind the world of Canada’s Arctic borders. This narrative that states that the “first and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty”31 is a traditional and recurrent discourse used by past policy-makers in Ottawa. Where climate change does have an impact on wording is by hinting that possible external pressures are “testing” Canada’s territorial integrity, therefore justifying an offensive discourse.32 In fact, Stephen Harper has frequently asserted “the first principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose it,”33 therefore intentionally implying that Canada may lose a part of its territory if Canadians neglect their Arctic frontier. In that perspective, Canada’s foreign policy is locked in a territorial narrative that describes
Canada’s North to Canadians and to others and supports a very monolithic
nationalistic view of Arctic geopolitics.34

For example, in August 2007, Peter MacKay, former foreign affairs minister and currently minister of national defence, reacted to the Russian flag planting incident on the Arctic Ocean seabed at the North Pole by describing it as a fifteenth century colonialist stunt, adding that states cannot “go around the world and just plant flags and say, ‘We’re claiming this territory’.”35 Minimizing the impacts of this incident, MacKay also pointed out that Canada’s “claims over our Arctic [geography] are very well-established,”36 while Stephen Harper warned that the Russian expedition “shows once again that sovereignty over the North and sovereignty in the Arctic is going to be an important issue as we move into the future.”37 This image of an external pressure “testing” Canada’s territorial integrity was again reinforced by Stephen Harper in 2010 when he acknowledged that “we live in a time of renewed foreign interest in Canada’s Arctic. With foreign aircraft probing the skies, vessels plying northern waters, and the eyes of the world gazing our way, we must remain vigilant.”38 These images suggest potential instability caused by external pressures (related to human activities in the Arctic), therefore heightening attention on Canada’s geography in the Arctic and how Canada must resist future potential security threats at its frontier.39

A Canadian Faux Pas?

In March 2010, observers blamed Canada for causing diplomatic irritations and geographical divisions in the Circumpolar World when the foreign affairs minister, Lawrence Cannon, convened the four other circumpolar coastal states to an exclusive A5 (Arctic 5 coastal states: Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, United States/Alaska, and Russia) ministerial meeting in Chelsea, Québec to discuss issues related to those countries’ “roles and responsibilities in areas under [their respective] jurisdiction[s] in the Arctic Ocean.”40 This was the second ministerial meeting between Arctic coastal states.41 The first one, A5-1, was held in Greenland in 2008.42 For Canada (which announced its mini-summit, A5-2, one month before it was held),43 this seemed an appropriate meeting for coastal states “at a time when there is increasing geopolitical interest in the region. It demonstrates political leadership and the strong working relationships between Arctic Ocean coastal states [and] highlights the co-operative approach that [these] states are already taking to address both the challenges and opportunities in the region.”44
Faced with vast criticism from domestic and international observers who accused Canada of “subdividing the council into the inner coastal five and an outer ring of non-coastal states and indigenous representation,” Lawrence Cannon replied by stating “if there is a disaster in the area, they [victims] will look at us to bring aid, and the coast guard to provide search and rescue … Those are things that fundamentally fall on Arctic coastal states.” Then again, months later in November 2010, Cannon also stated “we are well advanced in our negotiations regarding a search and rescue agreement within the Arctic Council, and I am hopeful that we will have results as early as next May [2011] at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting.” Weeks before the Chelsea conference, a spokesperson at the federal government Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) legitimatized his minister’s decision regarding the A5 meeting by explaining that “there is no desire on Canada’s part to duplicate the Arctic Council’s agenda or call into question the work it is currently undertaking.” He insisted that DFAIT wanted to hold a “ministerial-level discussion between states that have unique interests in and responsibilities for the Arctic Ocean. The results of this meeting can help to reinforce the work of the Arctic Council.”

As of 2011, Canada’s position on the A5 has remained unchanged since the March 2010 meeting. In fact, in the August 2010 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, the conservative government reaffirmed the importance of the Arctic Council (that Ottawa will chair between 2013–2015) as “the primary forum for collaboration among the eight Arctic states,” while maintaining Lawrence Cannon’s conviction that it will continue to deal exclusively with “the five coastal states on issues of particular relevance to the Arctic Ocean.” It seems reasonable if Canada genuinely wanted to discuss common issues with its Arctic coastal allies. Unfortunately, the outcomes of such an intentionally restrictive meeting remain unclear and Canada’s strategy for reinforcing Arctic co-operation even more ambiguous.

Uninvited Arctic Council member states (Finland, Iceland, Sweden) and Permanent Participants (Arctic Indigenous representatives to the Arctic Council) who also share common concerns related to “sustainable development and environmental protection” in the Arctic region, criticized Canada’s decision to go forward with an exclusive A5-2 meeting to discuss, behind closed doors, common regional issues. As key circumpolar partners, allies, and inhabitants of the North who have worked collaboratively on many significant issues related to the Arctic Ocean (e.g., Search and Rescue Taskforce and the Emergency Prevention,
Preparedness and Response Working Group and continue to strengthen their co-operation in the face of enormous climate change challenges, these excluded states and Permanent Participants unanimously warned that formalizing the A5 could potentially undermine the efforts of the Arctic Council as a central regional forum for furthering collaboration in the Circumpolar North. On that point, Ottawa’s separate A5-2 meeting was perceived by many as a perilous faux pas that “led to concerns about the full engagement of the three other Arctic states and Indigenous peoples organizations who shared in the development of the Arctic Council.”

Thus, Finland cautioned Canada and other international observers that formalizing the A5 could potentially “harm the role of the Arctic Council as a vehicle of trans-Atlantic and circumpolar cooperation.” From a Permanent Participant’s perspective, Pita Aatami, acting president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (and also president of the Nunavik Makivik Corporation), believes that it is “inconceivable that the Government of Canada would contemplate holding a conference to discuss economic development and environmental protection in the Arctic without the active participation of Inuit, who will have to live with the consequences of any new government policies.” Sweden’s Senior Arctic Official (SAO), Helena Ödmark, stated that the Swedish government worried that the A5-2 ministerial meeting “will have negative effects, of course, and we don’t want to see that. We told the Canadians that, but we haven’t really gotten a very good reply. We do see quite a risk of having this kind of a meeting and not being able to explain what the issues are.” In a communiqué released from the US Department of State, Secretary Hillary Clinton stressed that “significant international discussions on Arctic issues should include those who have legitimate interests in the region, and I hope the Arctic will always showcase our ability to work together, not create new divisions.”

While trying to bring coastal states together, Canada essentially created a geographical division (and formalized political subdivisions through A5-2) in a long-standing circumpolar framework where many actors felt pushed aside and many interests possibly overlooked. In fact, if Canada’s intentions could be interpreted as positive for coastal co-operation, the lack of clarity from Ottawa in holding such a meeting created a sense of awkwardness that still overshadows Canada’s foreign policy today.

On the other hand, Canadian historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer argues that holding such “a meeting at Chelsea is not incompatible with the Arctic Council.” However, he does point out that if the discussion between the A5 “crosses over into the social and economic realm, then it could potentially undermine the Arctic Council.” In a communiqué some
weeks before the 2010 event, Lawrence Cannon said that the objective of the Chelsea (A5-2) meeting was to:

... encourage new thinking on responsible development in the region from the perspective of the Arctic Ocean coastal states. This meeting will provide an opportunity for Arctic Ocean coastal states to prepare for and encourage development that has positive benefits, including economical and environmental. It will reinforce ongoing collaboration in the region, including in the Arctic Council ... The Arctic is a priority for the Canadian government, and Canada is an international leader on northern issues at the Arctic Council and in other forums ... This meeting will allow us to continue to deliver on the four pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy ... The Arctic Ocean coastal states are in a unique position to set the agenda for responsible management in the region.61

Setting “the agenda for responsible management in the region” outside the Arctic Council framework and discussing “responsible development,” coastal states’ “perspectives” on circumpolar affairs, and “economical and environmental” issues are clearly themes that could give the impression of an A5 exclusive group that could undermine the Arctic Council. Further, since Canada omitted highlighting that such a meeting could conceivably address UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issues or perspectives on legitimate (and desired) future state dialogue and co-operation in the Arctic Ocean, this could give the impression of a Canadian strategy based on promoting Canada as an unilateralist agenda-setting actor in the Arctic. Diplomatic consequences from such actions appeared unaccounted for.

A “One-Off”

Canada’s A5-2 meeting in Chelsea reignited unnecessary diplomatic tensions in the Arctic community and set fire to much international misunderstandings. Indeed, in May 2008, less than a year after the public-private submarine expedition that planted a Russian titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole and automatically warranted various interpretations on Russia’s Arctic foreign policy,62 Copenhagen invited the five coastal states to Ilulissat, Greenland (A5-1), to make clear that a new Cold War was not emerging between Russia and its coastal allies over what the media misleadingly depicted as a new Arctic bonanza rush. With this meeting, Denmark “urged all involved to abide by the United Nations rules on territorial claims and hope[d] to sign a declaration that
the United Nations would rule on any disputes.” Also, it was underlined that strengthening “cooperation over accidents, maritime security, and oil spills” would be discussed between the five Arctic states.

Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the Arctic Council Permanent Participants were excluded from the discussions in 2008 (as in the 2010 meeting). All of the actors voiced their concerns and cautioned for the first time that such gestures can potentially weaken the Arctic Council framework. Many observers believed that this was a mistake. Arctic security expert Rob Hubert explained that the Ilulissat meeting “should have been seen as a way of invigorating the Arctic Council, and the Arctic Council should have been the organization that was given the mandate to deal with it.” Indeed, this A5-1 was held to deal with a pressing issue: committing the “Arctic coastal states to an orderly management of Arctic [Ocean] problems on the basis of existing international law.” From that perspective, many actors were reassured by Arctic counterparts who felt the urgency to deal with an emerging concern for security and prosperity, like Iceland, which is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state but very much a maritime state geographically connected to the Arctic waters by the Norwegian, Greenlandic, and Barents Seas (and its exclusive economic zone). Accordingly, Iceland’s foreign affairs spokesperson, Urdur Gunnarsdottir, said that “we are hoping that we [A5] are not creating many forums to discuss some of the same issues that we’d focus within the forum that already exists.” Moreover, Gunnarsdottir pointed out that “we have discussed this meeting in Ilulissat with some of the countries ... and we have received assurances that the meeting will be a one-off, that it is not an attempt to create an alternative forum to the Arctic Council.”

With the Chelsea meeting (A5-2), Canada chose to formalize an exclusive informal group of five powerful coastal states outside the Arctic Council that had no clear mandate and could potentially weaken the current circumpolar framework. The idea of potentially undermining the Arctic Council is debatable since states have legitimate and sovereign rights to meet and discuss security concerns. However, the ambiguity created by a formalized A5-2 forum needs to be addressed in the actual cooperation framework between all Arctic states that have achieved a sense of community through dialogue since the end of the Cold War.

Having an A5 framework is now debated on many levels in international academic circles. Legitimate or not, this forum is approved by Canada and Russia, and criticized by the United States and non-coastal states. Overlooking the principle of a “one-off” A5-1 meeting in a time of great concern (2008), Canada’s A5-2 appears to have reinforced
a constructed geographical division between fundamental allies (Arctic powers and the others). In fact, in a November 2010 speech in Montréal, Lawrence Cannon was very clear on this desired geographical division between the Arctic states with different responsibilities. Cannon asserted:

Canada and the seven other members of the Arctic Council—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States—are taking our stewardship responsibility seriously. In addition, by virtue of their sovereignty and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean, the five coastal states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States—have unique responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean. Last March in Gatineau, Québec [Chelsea], I hosted an Arctic coastal states meeting to deal with the emerging issues we will face resulting from thousands of miles of accessible coastline.

The risk of pursuing this approach could have undesired results and potentially isolate Canada from the rest of the other states. Indeed, an uncalculated quest for leadership could lead to outcomes that jeopardize the diplomatic stability in the Circumpolar North but also between the Arctic and the world. For Oran Young, international governance professor and renowned Arctic expert:

... there is no indication that others are prepared to accept the role of the five coastal states as stewards who are deputized by the international community to look after Arctic issues in the interests of all. Recent developments point in the opposite direction. Influential states like China, associations of states like the European Union, and non-state actors like the WWF have all registered their objections to such an arrangement; there is every reason to expect that they will express stronger opposition to such an arrangement with the passage of time.

Indeed, Terry Fenge, a consultant on Arctic and Aboriginal issues, and Tony Penikett, former premier of the Yukon, assert that it is imperative that Canada thinks in “long-term, big-picture, strategic terms when developing a northern component to its foreign policy. We must understand our national interests in the region if our foreign policy is to equip us to respond to the increasingly significant challenges that lie ahead.” Therefore it seems that, through Cannon’s narrative, an avoidable diplomatic obstacle is being constructed between partners (like Canada) who cannot afford to work alone or in any restrictive way when facing common security concerns in
a complex and vast Arctic Ocean region where all possible resources (and burden sharing) should be welcome. However, by establishing clear goals and intentions for a legitimate A5 framework and including dialogue with other non-coastal states and actors, Canada can circumvent diplomatic frustrations and gain the leadership it seeks.

There are two fundamental differences between A5-1 (2008) and A5-2 (2010). First, the Greenland meeting in 2008 had clear goals and outcomes. The Ilulissat Declaration had significant results and constitutes today a historical component of Arctic co-operation. This declaration recognizes the “responsibilities on the five coastal states that result from the legal regime [and] that other states will participate in development and protection under the provisions of international law and through the International Maritime Organization, the Arctic Council and other relevant international fora.” Most importantly, this document served as a clear response to the international community’s concerns about stability in the region by stating “there will be no negotiation of an alternative regime for the Arctic Ocean that would be contrary to the provisions of the LOS Convention” and “suggested rather pointedly to others that they leave Arctic affairs to the coastal states.” Nevertheless, A5-1 indicated to the world that the Arctic states worked together, will continue to co-operate multilaterally on many common issues, and that the Circumpolar North is a stable and peaceful region. A5-2’s discourse engaged an opposite reaction since much of the attention was focused on division/tension and not co-operation in peaceful times between Arctic states (coastal or not).

Canada’s impulsive *tous azimuts* approach to this particular matter gave the impression of a disordered, uncoordinated Arctic structure—and Canadian foreign policy—that could have consequences beyond the Arctic Ocean and council. In fact, A5-2 reinforced the idea of an “exclusive” neighbourhood closing off an international ocean space and incorrectly giving itself the power to decide exclusively on the future of that space without consulting UNCLOS members (or Arctic inhabitants) who have legitimate interests in the region. Referring to the Ilulissat meeting, professor of geopolitics, Klaus Dodds, describes the A5 as a process of “five coastal states [that] sought to reinforce their ‘special relationship’ with the Arctic on the basis of geographical proximity.” However, the international community tends to be cautious when dealing with the idea of a “special relationship” in the Arctic. In a 2008 European Commission (EC) press release via Commissioner Joe Borg, it is declared “no country or group of countries have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean around it.” In fact, Dodds explains that “while acknowledging the
role of UNCLOS and the Arctic coastal states, the EC also notes the role of other ‘stakeholders.’ Indeed the ‘North Pole’ and central Arctic Ocean are important geographical markers, helping to consolidate this sense that the Arctic is not the exclusive province of the A-5.”79 Furthermore, “the current development of a rather exclusive ‘Arctic Club’ in (the) form of the five littoral states after their meetings in Ilulissat in 2008 and Chelsea in 2010 cannot really be in the interest of the Union [EU] as it excludes its Arctic member states Sweden and Finland [probably Iceland in the near future] and also the Union as its own player.”80

There seems to be unclear (and unannounced) gains for Canada in promoting the actual A5 framework with undefined intentions and outcomes. What precisely is Canada expecting from an A5 construction that is not attainable through the institutionalized Arctic Council forum and that guidelines from UNCLOS (dealing with continental shelves) cannot achieve?81 Does Canada need an A5 or rather an A2 with the United States in the North American Arctic that could better favour North American integration in the Arctic Council framework and with non-Arctic states? Continuing and reinforcing the dialogue between the A5 will require constructive and innovative steps toward ensuring there are stable relations and mutual confidence amongst all of the Arctic states as they work together within the Arctic Council and in other institutions.82

In fact, some observers argue that the Arctic Council is at a crossroads, meaning that all the “discussions over possible reformation in the council seem to end up in dealing with cosmetic changes within the accepted structure rather than revisiting the governance fundamentals in a critical manner.”83

Continuing and reinforcing dialogue between the A5 are the collaborative steps needed to maintain stable relations and confidence building between all these concerned states (as working together within the Arctic Council and in other institutions). Also, from the outside, seeing the United States and Russia working together and discussing common interests is an indication that the relationship between these past rivals is evolving in a positive manner. However, given the limited information on Ottawa’s intentions through an uncalculated tous azimuts rhetoric, this approach does not seem to compensate for the negative diplomatic impacts of formalizing a division between coastal and non-coastal states in the Arctic—particularly when the latter are fundamental regional allies sharing common needs and security concerns with Canada.

In fact, Ottawa’s gesture has pushed its greatest ally, the United States, to criticize this kind of behaviour. The EU is concerned and will not be left
isolated from Arctic affairs. The many members of the Arctic Council are on alert, and disappointed. Indigenous representatives and communities are once again offended by being excluded from decisions that will have consequences for their territories and daily lives. Finally, Canadians do not know more how and where Canada plans to lead this nation into a “different” North. While Canada’s willingness to play a key role in Arctic geopolitics and world affairs should continue to guide its foreign policy (with many new initiatives and engagements), leadership through an efficient and strategic tous azimuts approach means agreeing on clear and defined objectives with key allies based on mutual respect and shaped by shared understandings of every actor’s interests (circumpolar or not).

While Canada labels itself an “Arctic Power” and seeks influence through leadership in the region, its ambitions and their impacts should correspond with Canada’s national interest and global foreign policy. Uncalculated internationalism could have greater negative effects and weaken Canada’s political influence on the international stage. At the end of the Chelsea meeting, Canada’s circumpolar coastal allies chose not to attend (or were obliged not to for various reasons) Lawrence Cannon’s closing press conference. As an Arctic power, Ottawa believes its mandate is to influence Arctic geopolitics, not react to them. This is an ambiguous message—a rhetoric—that needs to be further explained or questioned. With scarce capabilities in the region, an evolving geopolitical North American/Circumpolar setting, and rapidly growing interest for the Arctic, Canada cannot gain from isolation or rejection. Promoting and strengthening collaboration within the Circumpolar World and with non-Arctic states should be the driving force of Canada’s foreign policy in an inclusive, globalized Arctic neighbourhood.

Concluding Remarks: From a Far North to a High North Discourse

As noted above, Ottawa’s foreign policy in the Arctic has historically been shaped by a Canadian northern frontier discourse—the Far North territory—that is an integral part of Canada’s identity. On the one hand, that narrative was significantly modified in the 1990s when decision makers in Ottawa recognized that the emerging Cold War circumpolar geopolitics could accommodate and reaffirm Canada’s northern identity through an institutionalized framework like the Arctic Council. Canada found in that process a legitimate and internationally recognized diplomatic role (leadership) that reproduced regional stability and security. Today, faced with climate change issues and challenges—common to all Arctic states—Canada is once again looking North with the same strategic goals.
in mind. A glance at Canada’s 2010 foreign policy statement for the Arctic highlights these traditional objectives. But Canada has yet to identify and define what it needs to bring to and gain from a rapidly changing Arctic that has much evolved since the 1990s.

The A5-1 and A5-2 “incident” illustrates one major problem in Canada’s Arctic approach today. While finding and rightfully taking advantage of every opportunity to advance Canada’s Arctic territoriality in international forums, Ottawa’s impulsive Arctic agenda lacks strategic planning, not opportunity. Indeed, if the former has been neglected, Canada has embarked on an international crusade—through Minister Cannon’s visits across the Circumpolar World and other non-Arctic states—to promote Canada’s Arctic territory and borders, thus identity. This discourse, presented by Canada’s Arctic foreign policy statement, is framed by “a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy and productive ecosystems” that, once again, are part of the formal discourse. Lawrence Cannon’s mission, as Canada’s foreign minister, has been to diffuse Canada’s integrated Northern Strategy vision without actually proposing any innovative or constructive way to deal with the emerging issues of the Arctic and the world today. In fact, by being present in other states to talk about Canada’s Arctic, Minister Cannon is anxiously trying to produce images of Canada as an “Arctic power” playing a key role in Arctic geopolitics. Results from such a task are yet to be known.

The basic question remains: where is Canada going with respect to the Arctic? Since the physical transformations of climate change are challenging all states, what can Canada do pragmatically in the region to advance its national interests that public diplomacy can no longer achieve? While maintaining and reinforcing its presence in the entire Circumpolar World (with defined plans and objectives), one place where Canada should be more present and pragmatic is in the North American Arctic and where Canada’s leadership in that evolving geopolitical and geo-economic setting is welcome.

Building with the North American Setting

As once asserted by Paul Painchaud, political scientist and Canadian foreign policy expert, “if we make the geopolitical choice of putting the Arctic in a central position—not only a region of concern, but in a central position—[of] our thinking on our foreign policy, that will mean that we will concentrate on a whole series of problems that we are dealing with
separately, such as, to begin with, the management of our relations with all the countries of the circumpolar region.”91 Indeed, Canada’s mandate in the contemporary Arctic should be to go beyond the Far North discourse while continuing the integration of Canadians in the daily activities of the region. Ottawa should not look to re-invent the regional dynamics of the Arctic but look to reinforce them. That huge challenge starts within the North American setting. As such, in the future, Ottawa should reinforce its links with Washington in the North American Arctic.

The possibility of building joint mechanisms with the United States to deal with common concerns in the Arctic is long overdue.92 Modifying the long-standing modus operandi between Ottawa and Washington, slightly revised for the northern context, would encourage burden sharing, region building, and bilateral cross-border endeavours to address emerging security risks. The potential exists for co-operation regarding potential maritime commerce preparedness, surveillance, bilateral military exercises, and environmental security. This renewed relationship—which favours bilateral strategic planning—could lead to more advanced collaboration over time. Increased co-operation with the United States in the region—as stated by Canada’s *Northern Strategy* and the *Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy*—could lead to Canada playing a defined and pragmatic year-round role in the Arctic. By concentrating Canada’s efforts on the construction of a North American Arctic discourse (where others can be integrated) and creating concrete projects that would increase connections amongst circumpolar regions, an “American-Canadian Arctic bloc” (based on an emerging geopolitical and geo-economic setting) could advance regional integration and prosperity.93 Through burden sharing, Canada would also need to recognize the advantages and outcomes of such huge but needed investments (education, science, research, development, security). From that initial but fundamental step, by creating regional similarities that are not clear today, the *rapprochement* of the Circumpolar World could be facilitated.94

Finally, Canada is at a crossroads in the North. The current government has identified the Arctic as an issue for policy-makers in Ottawa. Canada’s next foreign policy step is to recognize its domestic and international role in Arctic geopolitics. This means defining the national interest beyond the Far North and advancing Canada into the High North while rethinking *tous azimuts* diplomacy so it is consistent with what is taking place. In that process, Ottawa will need to put forward a pragmatic, proactive strategy that will change the way Canadians see the Arctic and the way the world understands Canada’s “circumpolarity” in an integrated Circumpolar...
North. For that to happen, Canada’s strategy needs to go beyond vagueness, rhetoric, and status quo while focusing on how, by being an Arctic state, Canada could be even more engaged and prosperous in the international community. Actively building stronger bridges with defined outcomes is a starting point. Building on past achievements such as the Arctic Council, the impetus for Canada to evolve and innovate in the Arctic has come.

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Notes
1. *Tous azimuts* is a French expression meaning “pointing in all directions.” Thus, the expression could be utilized in many ways and for many narrative purposes. In international relations, *tous azimuts* policies correspond to a state’s “everywhere foreign-defense policy” strategy that fulfils national security objectives. One well-known but specific example of a *tous azimuts* “doctrine” is 1960s France with its nuclear program strategically organized on a “*tous azimuts* theory” (“stratégie/défense tous azimuts”) for deploying nuclear weapons in all directions around the planet. Indeed, this defence program did not have one strategic objective (East Bloc) but rather all-round targets (breaking with Cold War bipolarity deterrence). The specificity of that example should not divert attention from the broader sense of *tous azimuts* as a familiar expression. In fact, in this article, *tous azimuts* means deploying in all directions a particular offensive geopolitical strategy (discourses from defense/military/security, diplomacy, science, environmental protection) to advance the national interest of Canada based on Canadian Arctic territoriality. This practice goes back to the 1970s when Canada started to shift its foreign policy attention to the North American Arctic. It is argued that the *tous azimuts* approach today appears unorganized, congested, and inconsistent with the national interest.
2. Sergei Lavrov and Jonas Gahr Støre, “Canada, Take Note: Here’s How to Resolve Maritime Disputes,” The Globe and Mail, 21 September 2010. Authors are the Russian foreign minister and the Norwegian foreign minister, respectively.

3. For the purposes of this paper, the Arctic (or “High North”) refers to Alaska; Iceland; Greenland; the Faroe Islands; and the northern areas of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Canada. See Lassi Heininen and Chris Southcott (ed.), Globalization and the Circumpolar North (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2010), 3. For various definitions of the Arctic see Frédéric Lasserre, “Qu’est-ce que l’Arctique?” in Passages et Mers Arctiques. Géopolitique d’une Région en Mutation ed. Frédéric Lasserre (Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2010), 6.


5. This means that “Just as a layout of a chessboard (or any other game board) and the distribution of pieces and their capabilities at a particular moment in time constrains or enables the subsequent movement of the pieces, the geopolitical setting affects the behavior of states in the international system.” These settings are characterized by location and geography, political-geographical arrangements, physical dimensions, and interactions. See Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, David Kinsella (ed.), World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Ninth Edition (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 76.

6. For Coates et al., Canada’s Arctic report card is an F (for failure). They explain: “Of all polar countries, Canada has been the weakest in developing the potential of its Arctic regions and in responding to its full range of responsibilities there ... Canada is the weakest of all polar countries in integrating the northern regions into the nation as a whole.” See Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Bill Morrison, Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allan Publishers, 2009), 191.


8. Heininen and Nicol point out that “in the future the Canadian North will focus more clearly upon building regional linkages with North Pacific Rim countries, and that the role of the Canadian North will be critical in

9. These interests include energy (oil and gas from the Barents Sea and potentially beyond), shipping (Northwest Passage/Northern Sea Route), fisheries (mostly in the Barents Sea for now), environmental security, and political stability (Arctic Council and multilateral relations in a globalized Arctic). For example, see “Defining an Interest: The European Union and the High North,” Geopolitics in the High North, accessed 2 December 2010, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org.

10. Some observers argue that non-Arctic states are perceived as “challenging their [Arctic states] sovereign rights to exploit their [Arctic states] natural resources.” Terry Fenge and Tony Penikett explain that “Minister Cannon should abandon ‘feel good’ rhetoric and embark on a serious exercise to bring Arctic issues, concerns and perspectives into the heart of Canada’s foreign policy.” Terry Fenge and Tony Penikett, “The Arctic Vacuum in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Policy Options (April 2009): 66–67.

11. Minister Cannon stated in November 2010 that the “development of the North is not a hockey tournament open to all nations. Unlike the continent of Antarctica, which has no permanent population and is subject to an international treaty, the Arctic is composed of sovereign countries, which are responsible for the well-being of its inhabitants.” Such statements reinforce the notion of exclusivity in the Circumpolar North for the Arctic states. Lawrence Cannon, “Address by Minister Cannon to Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) No. 2010/70, Moscow, Russia, 15 September 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2010/2010-070.aspx?lang=eng. Another similar message was stated by the minister at the release of the “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” in August 2010. Cannon declared that “L’Arctique est une partie de nous. Depuis longtemps. Aujourd’hui plus que jamais. Et pour toujours … The Arctic is part of us. Was. Is. And always will be.” Quoted in Jane George, “Canada Unveils New Arctic Foreign Policy Statement,” Nunatsiaq Online, 20 August 2010, accessed 28 January 2011, http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/98789_canada_unveils_new_arctic_foreign_policy_blueprint/.

12. On future challenges, Lawson Brigham explains that “The warming of the Arctic could mean more circumpolar transportation and access for the rest of the world—but also an increased likelihood of overexploited natural resources and surges of environmental refugees.” Furthermore, these
major changes “can transform this once-remote area into a new region of importance to the global economy.” See Lawson Brigham, “Thinking About the Arctic’s Future: Scenarios for 2040,” *The Futurist* (September-October 2007): 27.

13. For example, “The increased international shipping in the Arctic will cross paths directly with a major portion of the world’s fish stocks ... Approximately one million tourists visit the Arctic every year. With increasingly open Arctic waters, this number is expected to climb dramatically. And in the absence of clear guidelines, this kind of holiday may be risky business.” See Jessica Shadian, “Building Bridges (and Boats) Where there Once was Ice: Adopting a Circumpolar Approach in the Arctic,” *Policy Options* (April 2009), 73.

14. Also see all four pillars of the “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” DFAIT, 2010.


17. The concept of discourse is understood here as “sets of capabilities people have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities. It is NOT simply speech or written statements but the rules by which verbal speech and written statements are made meaningful. Discourses enable one to write, speak, listen and act meaningfully. They are a set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct into an organized, meaningful whole.” Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” in *The Geopolitics Reader*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 80.

See Lawrence Cannon, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” DFAIT No. 2009/11, 11 March 2009. In 2008, Stephen Harper had previously outlined the Government’s four-point Northern Strategy focused on strengthening Canada’s Arctic sovereignty; protecting the fragile northern environment; promoting economic and social development; and giving Northerners more control over their economic and political destiny.” See “Prime Minister Harper Delivers on Commitment to the ‘New North’,” 10 March 2008, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=2015.

“Canada and Russia are also major Arctic powers, as together, we account for more than three-quarters of the coastline of the Arctic Ocean.” Cannon, “Address by Minister Cannon to Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” On that point, Tuathail explains that “geography is a social and historical discourse which is always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology.” Ó Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse.” Furthermore, he explains that geopolitics is “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft “spatialize” international politics in such a way as to represent it as a “world” characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas.” Gerard Toal, “Critical Geopolitics: The Social Construction of Space and Place in the Practice of Statecraft,” Geography – Dissertations and Theses, Syracuse University, Paper 38, 1989.

Cannon, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” 2009.

For Gearóid Ó Tuathail: “Thus to study geopolitics we must study discourse, which can be defined as the representational practices by which cultures creatively constitute meaningful worlds ...” See Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, Second Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 1. Furthermore, “The study of geopolitics in discursive terms, therefore, is the study of the socio-cultural resources and rules by which geographies of international politics get written.” Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., “Geopolitics and Discourse,” 1998, 80.

See Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., The Geopolitics Reader, 2006, 1.

See the extensive work on this by Coates et al., Arctic Front.

See Yolande Dorion-Robitaille, Captain J. E. Bernier’s Contribution to Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1978).

See Ken S. Coates et al., Arctic Front.

A vast and rich literature is available on the Canada-U.S. disagreement over the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Some key authors who have written on the political and legal aspects of the Northwest Passage include Donat Pharand, Franklyn Griffiths, Michael Byers, Suzanne Lalonde, Rob Huebert, and Elizabeth Elliott-Meisel.
32. “… as Prime Minister [Stephen] Harper has said, our sovereignty in the Arctic and our borders are not negotiable.” DFAIT, “Address by Minister Cannon to Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry.”
33. See Kristin Bartenstein, “‘Use It or Lose It’: An Appropriate and Wise Slogan?” Policy Options (July-August 2010), 69–73.
34. An example of this discourse is illustrated by a recent speech by Minister Cannon in Russia where he stated “During my visit to your country, I will discuss a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues with my colleague, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. But today, I would like to talk more specifically to you about the Government of Canada’s perspectives on Arctic developments and our recently released Arctic foreign policy.” See Cannon, “Address by Minister Cannon to Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry.”
In 2008, the Canadian government was represented by its minister for natural resources, Gary Lunn. Washington had sent its deputy secretary of state, John Negroponte; Russia sent its minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov; and Norway sent its minister of foreign affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre.

I will be addressing the Ilulissat meeting further on in this article.


Emphasis added by author.


DFAIT, “Statement on Canada's Foreign Policy for the Arctic.”


See Arctic Council, “About Arctic Council.”


This was the second Arctic Five coastal states meeting (A5).


Quoted in Carl Meyer, “Canada Called Out.”


Boswell, “Arctic Summit.”

DFAIT, “Canada to Host Ministerial Meeting of Arctic Ocean Coastal States.”

Berkman, “Environmental Security,” 106; P.E. Steinberg explains that the 2007 Russian North Pole expedition “was conceived not by the Russian state but by an Australian-American group of deep sea exploration enthusiasts who obtained funding from Swedish pharmaceutical magnate Frederik Paulsen, and who sought Russian participation not to make a political statement but because Russia controlled two of the five submersibles capable of fulfilling the mission.” See P.E. Steinberg, “You Are (Not) Here: On the Ambiguity of Flag Planting and Finger Pointing in the Arctic,” Political Geography 29 (2010), 81–84. On the media reactions and governmental statements, Charles Emmerson makes clear that “Although the expedition had been conceived of internationally, the people who actually got to the seabed at the North Pole first were all Russian, in a Russian submarine, launched from a Russian ship.” Further, Emmerson explains that initially, the promoters of the expedition “were a retired American submarine captain, Alfred McLaren, and an Australian entrepreneur, Mike McDowell [and] it was Swedish money, from the pharmaceuticals millionaire Fredrik Paulsen, that put the expedition on a sound financial footing.” See Charles E. Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 82–83.


68. On the debates of A5/A8, see Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Governing the Far North.”

69. In a statement released on 30 March 2010 by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada and dealing with the Chelsea meeting, there is mention at the very end on “five Arctic powers,” an idea that has often been mentioned in Canada’s Arctic foreign policy discourse. See Embassy of the Russian Federation, “Outcome of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Ocean Coastal States, Chelsea, Canada,” Embassy of Russia, 1 April 2010, http://www.rusembassy.ca/ru/node/382.

70. Cannon, Third Annual Arctic Shipping North America Conference.


74. Young, “Whither the Arctic,” 179.

75. On the stability of the Circumpolar North, see work by Dr. Lassi Heininen of the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland.

76. Berkman demonstrates how non-Arctic states have a long-standing involvement of non-Arctic states in Arctic matters. See Berkman, “Environmental Security,” 93.


79. Klaus Dodds, “Flag Planting,” 72.


81. On the role of the Arctic Council for all Arctic states, Jessica Shadian explains that “the Arctic Council, which is consensus based, has successfully produced several comprehensive scientific assessments, successes that both the EU Commission and the US Arctic Policy affirm. These assessments
include the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) study of the impact of Arctic oil and gas development. A shipping assessment [has been published in 2010].

... The Arctic Council is a body that can evolve into such a governance arrangement ... Of particular importance is the need for well coordinated Arctic research with a direct conduit to policy, notably regarding seismic studies, oil spill prevention, fisheries, climate change, social sciences, Arctic human health, mapping the seabed floor, ice-breaker technology, off-shore development technology and maritime health and safety. See Shadian, “Building Bridges,” 74.


83. Ibid, 153.


86. Charles Emmerson depicts Canada and the United States as very young Arctic countries that do not compare to the other Arctic countries whose behaviour and interest in the Arctic is deeply rooted in the history and culture of their inhabitants. See Charles Emmerson, The Future History.

87. DFAIT, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.”

88. See footnote 12.

89. On Canada and the US in the Arctic, see Franklyn Griffiths, “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy,” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, no. 1 (Canadian International Council, May 2009).

90. See footnote 5.


93. This builds upon an idea reintroduced recently by Paul Arthur Berkman, promoting greater Arctic cultural relations and understandings between Canadians (southerners and northerners) and the rest of the Circumpolar North and the rest of the world world “brings down barriers to trust, which
in turn allows progress and in many cases increased security.” See Berkman, “Environmental Security,” xii.

94. Chris Southcott explains that “dealing with the circumpolar world as a totality is a difficult thing to do. The different areas of the region have been exposed to different imperial and national traditions that make it seemingly impossible to talk about the region as sharing in any sort of common history. Yet while there are national differences in the region, there are also a remarkable number of historical similarities. These similarities are linked in large part to common economic systems that characterized the region at different periods of time, each of which has left its mark on communities in the different areas of the North in varying ways. The similarities of these systems across the region lead on to attempt to see a common pan-Arctic political economy.” See Southcott, “History of Globalization,” 2.