

“Not Just Givers of Welfare”: The Changing Role of the RCMP in the Baffin Region, 1920–1970

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Abstract: In the 1920s the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) became Canada's first permanent official presence in the Baffin Region. Until the 1950s the Mounties travelled by dogsled, boat, and on foot delivering a variety of services as well as collecting information on Inuit, animals, and traders for the federal government. Through their exposure to Inuit on the trails and in the small scattered camps, the Mounties developed an admiration and respect for Inuit and their hunting and trapping lifestyle. The RCMP, indeed, became the self-appointed guardians of the Inuit. As the only permanent representatives of the federal government in the region they undertook the work of absentee government departments. Their reports provided Ottawa with one of the few threads of intelligence on the area. However, the RCMP's diverse set of duties became more narrowly focused and attuned to community policing operations during the 1950s and 1960s when the northern bureaucracy exploded and Inuit took up residence in centralized settlements. The RCMP's transformation from “giver(s) of welfare” to police officers was mirrored by a similar change in the force's relationship with, and attitude towards, Inuit. This article explores the changing role of the RCMP in the Baffin region, which was largely complete by 1970.

The modernization of the Eastern Arctic during the twentieth century has been a subject of much study by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and most recently by the Qikiqtani Truth Commission.¹ While the literature on this period is vast, few have focused on the role of the RCMP in the North past the 1920s when the police were sent north to establish law and buttress sovereignty. William Morrison's *Showing the Flag* provides an excellent history of the force's growth in the Northwest Territories as the RCMP evolved from a regional frontier force to an urban national force by 1920.² Morrison carefully examines the force's penetration into Hudson's Bay in the century's first decade and the establishment of a post at Fullerton Harbour in 1903-1904.³ While Morrison devotes a chapter to the establishment of permanent posts in

the Eastern Arctic in the 1920s, the history of the force's development between 1930 and 1970 falls outside the scope of his study. Shelagh Grant provides a good analysis of RCMP–Inuit relations on northern Baffin Island during the 1920s in her work *Arctic Justice*, which examines the murder of a white trader by Inuit on northern Baffin Island and the government's response.⁴ Several other accounts touch on the specific regions or personalities in the North, notably Lyle Dick's *Muskox Land*, which provides a history of Ellesmere Island, and William Barr's *Red Serge and Polar Bear Pants*, a biography of long-time northern RCMP constable Harry Stallworthy.⁵ In addition, a solid literature developed in the 1990s around the High Arctic relocations of the 1950s and the key role played by the RCMP in those events.⁶ Except for the Morrison history, however, the RCMP as an organization is not the focus of any of these works. This article places the RCMP at the centre of a changing Baffin Region.

The RCMP sat on the Northwest Territories (NWT) Council from its inception and helped influence Canada's northern policy. Under the *Northwest Territories Amendment Act* of 1905, the RCMP Commissioner (then Comptroller) was appointed commissioner of the council. The Act provided for a council of four although it was never staffed. The RCMP Comptroller, Lieutenant-Colonel Fred White, administered the NWT without a council until his death in 1918; as it happened, the government's administrative duties were minimal.⁷ After White's death the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, W.L. Cory, was appointed commissioner. As historian Mark Dickerson points out, "This began a tradition of combining, in one individual, the deputy minister of the department and the chief executive officer of the NWT."⁸ As a result of the discovery of oil in Norman Wells in 1920, the Act was amended in 1921 to enlarge the council to six members. The administration of the Arctic was transferred to the Department of the Interior, but the RCMP retained a seat on the council, where it reported on activities in the North and undoubtedly influenced council decisions.⁹

The first police detachments in the Baffin Region opened in Pond Inlet and Craig Harbour in 1922. Further posts were established at Pangnirtung (1923), Dundas Harbour (1924), the Bache Peninsula (1926), and Lake Harbour (1927). With six posts, a couple of dozen officers and handful of buildings, Canada announced its presence to Inuit, traders, explorers, and foreigners. The RCMP were the ideal agency to bring the moral and civil codes of Canada north; the force had decades of experience with Aboriginals, traders, and transients north of the treeline in the Western Arctic. Its quasi-military structure and the mythology surrounding the Mounties appealed to

young men who could be expected to travel, live, and administer affairs in a harsh environment.¹⁰

Beyond law enforcement, the RCMP provided social services to Inuit and carried out various administrative tasks on behalf of the government. The force was given a broad range of duties that could not be carried out from an isolated police post. Instead, several times a year the RCMP took to the tundra and ice on sometimes lengthy and often arduous patrols.¹¹ More than anything else, the northern patrol defined the force in the Eastern Arctic until the 1960s.¹² They are an iconic part of the RCMP's history and perhaps for that reason the patrol reports have survived while many other agency records have been destroyed.¹³ These documents provide insights into the RCMP duties, their relations with Inuit, and the general history of the Baffin Region during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.

The operation of patrols was fairly standard. In the winter the patrols were carried out by dogsled and in the summer by boat. The Mounties never travelled without an Inuit guide or Inuit special constables, usually two. The daily routine, always dictated by the weather, would start early with a quick breakfast; then the dogs would be harnessed and the sleds packed before the patrol set out for the day, with brief stops along the way to untangle the dog harnesses and brew a quick pot of tea. Officers could spend over twelve hours on the trail and, depending on the weather and terrain, the patrol might cover forty or more kilometres in a day; bad weather and difficult terrain could restrict progress to just a few kilometres. At the end of the day, the igloo would be built and the dogs tended to. If the patrol was fortunate enough to have arrived at an Inuit camp, their igloo would usually be constructed for them and the *qulliq* ('oil lamp')¹⁴ prepared by the women of the camp.¹⁵

Each patrol had the potential for adventure and disaster. The February 1926 Pangnirtung patrol to southern Baffin Island led by J.E.F. Wight is a case in point.¹⁶ The patrol sought an inland route between Pangnirtung and Lake Harbour while also investigating rumours that an Inuk had been murdered by a white man. The patrol departed on February 15th with two sleds and twenty-four dogs in -35° weather. Heavy snows slowed the dog teams and the men had to walk alongside, causing them to sweat profusely. Their dampened animal skin clothing froze during the nights and with no way to dry the clothes the patrol had to begin each day by prying open their frozen jackets and pants to get dressed. The map they followed, provided by the Geological Survey of Canada, was fundamentally wrong and the patrol spent unnecessary time and resources travelling in the wrong direction. To make matters worse, the dogs were nearing starvation; two had already

disappeared in the night, and there appeared to be little chance of securing caribou in the interior as the patrol had expected. The decision was made by the patrol to abandon their original route and cut south towards the coast where they might find some sealing grounds or run into an Inuit camp with spare dog food. They had run out of dog food days before and decided on March 2nd to abandon one of their sleds and harness all the dogs to the other sled to make quicker progress. The men gathered whatever edible materials they could spare—seal skin boots, butter, bacon, and biscuits—and fed it to the dogs hoping that it would be enough to finish the trip. The gravity of the situation was quite clear to them: “A storm at this time would have been disastrous for the patrol,” Wight recorded in the patrol report.¹⁷

The few Inuit the Wight patrol encountered along the coast could provide no assistance. In some cases they were worse off than the patrol that had been travelling for weeks. The police reported:

I gave what food I thought I could spare from our trip and sent a man into the Post (Amadjuak) Tuesday morning with a note to the Post manager to devise some manner of relief to these people and if there was no other way to arrange it, to supply them from the store and charge to the Police Account.¹⁸

At other camps people had lost their dogs to starvation. The police finally arrived at Lake Harbour on March 20th, the dogs “about played out after being on starvation rations for about three weeks.”¹⁹ They rested there for nine days before beginning their return journey to Pangnirtung. The patrol covered more than 2,000 km in fifty-one days and visited 654 Inuit.²⁰

The 1926 Pangnirtung patrol was exceptional in its hardships, length, and challenges. Generally, patrols were of a much more routine nature. A review of the patrol reports for the three busiest detachments between 1922 and 1940 (Lake Harbour, Pangnirtung, and Pond Inlet) reveal three core activities of the detachments: conducting routine administrative duties on behalf of government departments; providing assistance in the form of relief, basic medical treatment, or adjudications on behalf of Inuit; and investigating complaints and enforcing the law.

At times, the police were called up to carry out a variety of administrative duties including collecting census information, delivering mail, registering vital statistics, collecting duties, paying wolf bounties, and acting as Justices of the Peace. On occasion, they supported scientific surveys in the area or collected liquor permits from traders.²¹ More frequently, however, they monitored the game conditions throughout the Baffin Region. They reported

on caribou herds and fox populations, issued wolf bounties and licenses to trappers, and were responsible for enforcing the *Northwest Game Act* and *Migratory Birds Convention Act*. The emphasis on animal surveillance and control illustrates just how important animal resources were to Inuit, and the awareness of the RCMP and of Ottawa of this dependence.

In addition to conducting government business, the police were often called upon to deliver relief or basic medical services.²² The patrol reports provide a host of examples where the RCMP were required to pull teeth; treat burns, gunshot wounds, and dog bites; and, on a few occasions, help with difficult pregnancies. When they could not provide treatment, the RCMP often arranged to have the sick taken to the post at ship time to be examined by a doctor, or later to Pangnirtung after the hospital there was established.²³ The frequency of police having to perform basic medical procedures increased throughout the decades to the point where, near the end of the frontier police period (in the 1950s), volunteers for northern service were sent to Charles Camsell Hospital in Edmonton for a short two-week course that, in part, trained the officers in basic first aid, dentistry, and child birthing.

In some cases, the RCMP were the first to arrive on the scene of near disaster where starvation had killed or threatened to kill entire camps. The police provided what they could with their limited supplies and often arranged for relief to be delivered or issued at the local trading post. In other cases, the patrol was undertaken for the purpose of bringing relief to some of the more desperate camps.²⁴ As the RCMP gained more experience in the Arctic, they became acutely aware of the need to prevent such tragedies by issuing relief ammunition or transporting Inuit to more plentiful hunting grounds before starvation was upon the camp.²⁵ In 1934, the Pangnirtung detachment organized and used the police whale boat on a large walrus hunt that took sixty-nine animals; after dividing up the shares between the hunters that led the hunt, the police distributed part of the remaining share to the most disadvantaged camps in the area.²⁶ While the police cannot be considered the front line of assistance, they were responsible at times for relieving starvation, soothing illness, and saving lives.

The Mounties also acted as law enforcement agents. In many cases the interpretation and enforcement of Canada's laws was left to the discretion of the largely autonomous RCMP officers stationed in the North—who often chose not to impose southern laws on Inuit.²⁷ On several occasions the police reports recorded cases of polygamy but no charges were ever laid.²⁸ Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski note in their important study of game management in the Eastern Arctic that “enforcement was, by admission

of the RCMP, sporadic, depending on the inclination of the officer and his perception of what was important and appropriate in the context in which he found himself."²⁹ Policing the Eastern Arctic required a special brand of enforcement; laws had to be flexible. The Mounties realized that Inuit actions that contravened Canadian law were often directly related to survival, and individual officers frequently overlooked the violation of game laws to obtain meat; theft from caches to feed starving family members; and even marriage customs where a man took two wives, one of whom bore children and the other whom supported him through cooking, cleaning skins, or preparing clothing. To fine, prosecute, or incarcerate Inuit for these transgressions could apply undue pressure to a small Inuit kin group that depended on all of its members for survival.

On occasion the patrols investigated drownings, deaths, thefts, and other assorted crimes.³⁰ These investigation reports have been destroyed, however, so it is impossible to determine the extent of crime in the Eastern Arctic. Surviving patrol reports do demonstrate several occurrences when police were called upon to investigate persons acting "insane" or behaving in threatening ways. During the first years of the RCMP in the Baffin Region, the police investigated the killing of Robert Janes, a white trader, by Nuqallq and Inuit from Northern Baffin Island. The ensuing investigation revealed that Janes had begun acting irrationally and threatened to shoot Inuit dogs and possibly the Inuit as well.³¹ Soon after, in 1922, the police were called to Kivitoo on the east coast of Baffin Island to investigate three deaths that had stemmed from a bout of "religious insanity."³² The police were careful from this point forward to watch for signs of irrational behaviour. In 1938 the police at Lake Harbour removed an Inuk from a nearby camp; he was sent aboard the ship *Nascopie* after acting in a way that frightened the local Inuit.³³ Two other reports were received at the same detachment the following year, although it was found that the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) trader had "greatly exaggerated" one of the complaints.³⁴ In other cases, the police decided to take into custody the individual acting strangely so they could observe him. This was the case with Kaloukgillie, who was first brought into custody in 1933 after the police had received reports that his actions were scaring local Inuit. He accompanied the police on patrols and hunting expeditions, and quite likely acted as a guide and labourer around the detachment. Kaloukgillie was deemed to have recovered in 1935 and was sent back to live at his camp.³⁵

The police powers to remove Inuit from their camps, to hold them for observation, and to order that relief supplies be provided all speak to the disproportionate amount of power police exercised in their relations with

Ottawa. They were authority figures and extensions of the colonial power in Ottawa, and it was not uncommon for the police to use coercion and intimidation in dealing with Inuit. One officer reported to headquarters that he had “persuaded” an Inuk to accompany him to the trading post so that it could be explained to him that he would be required to guide the police the following year.³⁶ There was no indication that he was given a choice in the matter. The RCMP represented a great power to Inuit. They could take Inuit away from their camps and family either for medical, educational, or punitive reasons. For Inuit, the relationship with the police was characterized by an overwhelming sense of awe and fear. The fear, provoked by police officers, traders, and many other non-Inuit, is an Inuit concept called *ilira*. Anthropologist Hugh Brody explains:

The word seems to have at its centre the feeling of nervous awe that comes from being at an irreversible disadvantage, a situation in which one cannot modify or control the actions of another; it can also describe unpredictability—one is *ilira* of a person whose actions cannot be predicted, nor understood. It is therefore a term that neatly describes situations in which a person is in contact with a culturally dissimilar group, such as the visitor to a household that speaks a language he cannot understand. The term captures the feeling of the dominated towards those who dominate them, and may also connote dependence.³⁷

Despite the dominance and clear extension of colonialism, Mountie memoirs and recollections demonstrate a clear admiration and affection for Inuit—something uncommon in RCMP–Aboriginal relations generally.³⁸ Through their exposure to Inuit at the post, on the trail, and in the camps, the RCMP developed a great respect for Inuit resourcefulness, hospitality, and good nature. At the forefront of this exposure were the Inuit Special Constables. Originally hired as “temporarily employed natives,” the Inuit were taken on for their ability to hunt and guide and, in some cases, for their capacity for English. After 1936, they were officially recognized as special constables.³⁹ Their main function was to act as guide and intermediary on the patrols. They would drive the dog team, prepare tea during trail breaks, and at the end of the day they would build a shelter and tend to the animals. A crucial function of the special constables was mediating between the cultures. Often the children of special constables grew up around the police post and, when they were old enough, would inherit the job. This meant that the younger generations had lived a life exposed to the peculiarities of the *Qallunaat* (non-Inuit) mindset. Inuit often reported that the RCMP officers,

especially the new arrivals to the North, were like children: “they would watch you before they actually knew what to do. But once they found out what to do, they would start helping out. They would end up helping a lot out after that.”⁴⁰ Despite media depictions to the contrary, the special constables became responsible for the police that had been sent to protect them.⁴¹ Bob Pilot, long-time northern resident and former RCMP officer, demonstrated the esteem RCMP held for Inuit special constables, and one in particular, when he wrote: “It was always said that at the detachment the corporal was in charge, but on patrol, Kyak was in charge.”⁴² To many officers, the way of life was to be appreciated, as was the Inuit approach to it. Officers respected Inuit hunters who remained on the land and travelled to the post only to trade or at ship time. Those Inuit who gravitated to the posts too often, or loitered too long, were held in much lower esteem and often in outright disdain.

Beginning in the 1940s and accelerating in the 1950s, Inuit increasingly began moving closer to the posts or to the government established settlements. It was a transition the RCMP strongly resisted. A complicated series of events contributed to the massive and sudden modernization of the Eastern Arctic primarily during the 1950s. The militarization of the North in conjunction with the United States—first the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, then the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command, and later and more significantly the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line—opened the North’s airways as a transportation and communication system and affected seasonal movement patterns of both Inuit and game.⁴³ Reports of starvation and Third World conditions in the Eastern Arctic were carried back by American military personnel after the Second World War and spread in southern newspapers, magazines, and books. Reading between the lines of sensationalism the message was clear: Inuit life was changing. The introduction of family allowances, the increasing reliance on imported technologies, and the crash of the fox-fur market brought Inuit into a more dependent relationship with the state. The government, aware of the changing nature of the North, scrambled to address the problems of insufficient game resources, a health crisis that saw a large portion of the Inuit population from all over the Baffin Region in southern sanatoria, and a failing traditional economy.⁴⁴

In addition to these socio-cultural issues facing the government, Cold War tensions and industrial development interests forced the government to awaken from its long period of “absent-mindedness”⁴⁵ towards the North.⁴⁶ In 1952, representatives of ten federal agencies, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the Anglican and Catholic churches attended the Conference on Eskimo Affairs. The broad range of topics discussed pointed to the need to establish

a continuing consultative committee, resulting in the birth of the Eskimo Affairs Committee (EAC) in 1953. The EAC considered a range of northern issues, foremost of which was economic development and education. Resulting initiatives included the Eskimo Loan Fund and the introduction of Northern Service Officers (NSO) who were to coordinate the activities of the existing field agencies (RCMP, HBC, churches) to help improve economic and social living conditions. It was never intended that NSOs would take over the myriad of services the RCMP were performing.⁴⁷

On the ground, the RCMP witnessed the mounting social problems in the North that change was bringing:

The Eskimos generally have drifted into a state of lack of initiative and confusion. Conditions generally are appalling. Never has there existed so much destitution, filth and squalor as exists today, and in the opinion of some people the conditions under which some natives live is a disgrace to Canada, surpassing the worst evils of slum areas in cities. Bad sanitary and economic conditions are gradually undermining the health of these people and if not checked will ultimately result in the[ir] extermination.⁴⁸

Such accounts, this one in a memo on food shortages, undoubtedly had some influence on southern policy-makers who began to develop health and education programs for the Baffin Region.⁴⁹ In 1952 the government began sending civil servants north for the express purpose of ensuring the welfare of Inuit.⁵⁰ The NSOs were to seek ways to improve the northern economy and to monitor the relations between whites and Inuit.⁵¹ While the DEW Line provided ample opportunity for Inuit to earn an income, both the then Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DNANR) and the RCMP expressed concern about the influence of increased exposure to southerners, especially “construction workers ... living in a barracks setting.”⁵²

Throughout the 1950s, the RCMP Annual Conditions Amongst the Eskimos reports demonstrate an increasing concern with loitering around the defense construction sites.⁵³ Officers patrolling the eastern coast of Baffin Island in 1956 reported a substantial amount of loitering around DEW Line sites 39 and 40—Kivitoo and Padloping. A patrol reported that none of the Inuit men were out hunting at Padloping; at Kivitoo the Inuit camp had relocated to within half a mile (.8 km) of the lower base and had set up permanent shelters. RCMP Corporal C. G. Barr wrote to headquarters recommending that the NSO based in Frobisher Bay (now Iqaluit) force Inuit to return to their original camps or anywhere else they wanted to go as

long as they were away from the base. Further recommendations included banning all natives from the mess halls, the theatres, the garbage piles, or anywhere near the sites unless they had direct business with the military installations. The RCMP cautioned: “now is the time for drastic measures to be taken, if the government doesn’t want to have all these Eskimos on Government Relief in the next few years.”⁵⁴ Already, in some places, the Commissioner of the RCMP had noted “a drop in their native characteristic of sturdy independence and a growth in objectionable habits” such as relying on handouts, petty thievery, and prostitution.⁵⁵

The RCMP recognized that the change that had come to the North was irreversible, yet they cautioned that it should proceed slowly, retaining as much Inuit culture as possible while easing Inuit into a southern economy and lifestyle. As RCMP Commissioner L. H. Nicholson pleaded in 1959, “if there is to be a process of absorption by other races, let it be slow and let it take place in a way that does not hurt the Eskimo.”⁵⁶ To accomplish this, Nicholson felt the Inuit should be kept in small communities, of a dozen families or so, where they could maintain a traditional hunting and trapping lifestyle. Those Inuit who had vocational training could find employment. Nicholson remarked that “work with the Inuit should be conducted in the north and where possible Inuit should be kept separated from the whites— unless they had employment or housing.”⁵⁷ His solution to the problem was to bar them from clustering around white settlements and keep them at a distance of “20 miles” (32 km) or more.⁵⁸

The Department of Northern Affairs had different ideas on what was best for the Inuit. The department’s director, Ben Sivertz, wrote a memo to all field staff that clearly identified where DNANR’s “philosophy” differed from the RCMP. There was no need to erect a bar that would keep Inuit twenty miles from the settlements. In Sivertz’s opinion, Inuit were entitled to change and the creation of invisible barriers was a form of discrimination. The department believed that an accelerated program of “cultural adaptation” could acculturate Inuit to a “Canadian” way of life within as little as a single generation.⁵⁹ By 1959, DNANR had assumed full responsibility for the welfare of Inuit. Northern Service Officers had become known as Area Administrators, teachers were being established in the more populous communities, and the first attempts at low-cost housing had been initiated.

The year 1959 also marked the beginning of a new chapter in the RCMP’s northern history. Since his appointment as commissioner in 1951, Nicholson had supported within the RCMP, and advocated publically, a policy of minimal interference with Inuit hunting and lifestyle. During the 1950s the size of the RCMP doubled, and the RCMP policed more than 118

municipalities across Canada by 1960.⁶⁰ New sections within the RCMP had been established to deal with emerging types of crime and subversive activities.⁶¹ One of the final changes initiated by Nicholson was in the area of RCMP training.⁶² A new emphasis was placed on practical police training that concentrated more on arrest and search techniques and less on the softer aspects of police work. Too much time was being wasted, in the commissioner's opinion, on abstract subjects and not enough time on practical day-to-day police procedure."⁶³ This had ramifications for the North: shortly afterwards, northern-specific training, which included basic medical training, ended. By the 1960s, the Mounties had become something different from the colonial force that had settled the West. The force had become bureaucratized.

Nicholson would be the last RCMP commissioner to sit on the Northwest Territories Council. In 1961, the cabinet decided to remove the RCMP from the council, although Nicholson continued on until his resignation in 1963. For more than half a century, the RCMP pressure on the NWT Council had been informed by their extensive knowledge of Arctic conditions and direct experience with the people: "The RCMP has maintained detachments throughout the far reaches of the north for more than sixty-five years and has subsequently gained more knowledge than other government departments now in the North," remarked one disgruntled officer in a complaint about the removal of the commissioner from the council.⁶⁴ By removing the RCMP from the council, the government was rejecting the force's opinion about how development in the North should proceed. Instead of influencing the direction of government programs, and providing insight into problems facing Inuit or their cultural practices, the RCMP acquiesced in the growing bureaucracy and assumed the narrower role of primarily enforcing the law.

The RCMP's transformation in the 1950s was mirrored by a similar growth and expansion of the federal Department of Northern Affairs. The scattered outposts of the churches, Hudson's Bay Company stores, and police posts in the Baffin Region became focal points of government development. The expansion was rapid. In 1960, five of the twelve settlements in the Baffin Region received new schools; two more schools were delivered to communities in 1962. Teachers were sent to hold school and they also took over the responsibility from the RCMP for delivery of social services. Area Administrators (formerly known as NSOs) went to other communities and began taking over the responsibility for distributing social transfers in 1961.⁶⁵ Soon after the schools arrived, the government embarked upon an ambitious housing program that aimed to provide 1,600 multi-room homes across the North. More and more Inuit left the camps and moved closer to the

settlements. Some moved to be closer to their children who were attending school, others to take advantage of housing. More southerners arrived to teach Inuit, help build houses, develop community programs, and take advantage of the massive government investment in the North. By the early 1960s, the government's policy of dispersal had given way to a welfare state policy.⁶⁶

In the changing Baffin Region, the RCMP assumed a new and different role. The Officer in Charge (OiC) of "G" Division, W. G. Fraser, commented in 1962:

An important factor which has changed our responsibilities to a degree is the rush of Eskimos from the land to the settlements. Not too many years ago, the Eskimos were spread over the whole of the high Arctic and invariably our detachments were required to make extensive patrols by dog teams to visit the natives. Today this is not so to the same extent and in some cases the natives have almost given up their native way of life and tend to loiter around white men's settlements. This trend is unfortunate but apparently must be expected as part of the transition of these emerging people.⁶⁷

With this admission, the RCMP resigned itself to its new position in the North. The rapid centralization of Inuit in settlements had created social disorder. Henceforth, the RCMP would "spend far more time policing the settlements" and less time providing the range of administrative and welfare related services they had done since they first arrived in the Baffin Region.⁶⁸

During the 1960s the RCMP would be called upon to deal with a variety of crimes unknown to the region previously. Most of the troubles stemmed from the use of alcohol. Fraser wrote that "liquor is probably the biggest contributor to people running afoul of the law."⁶⁹ It had been illegal for Inuit to drink alcohol until a 1959 decision by NWT magistrate Jack Sissons declared that Inuit had the same rights as any other Canadian citizen and were entitled to use alcohol. While Frobisher Bay (Iqaluit) residents were the only ones with ready access to liquor, home brewing of methyl hydrate was reported in several of the smaller settlements. An officer stationed in Grise Fiord reported, "trouble in one form or another is inevitable should brewing be allowed to continue, legally or otherwise."⁷⁰ Similar concerns were voiced from both Cape Dorset and Igloolik in the second half of the 1960s. Another officer recalled in a recent interview, "Dorset already had an alcohol problem in 1968. It was 'drink till you drop.'"⁷¹

Alcohol led to other criminal activities such as spousal abuse, assault, theft, adultery, sexual assault, vandalism, and child abuse. There had been

nineteen convictions in Frobisher Bay in 1957; four years later there were 190 convictions, of which 116 were under the liquor ordinance. In 1964, RCMP Chief Superintendent MacDonnell told the NWT Council that “alcohol was a factor in 99 per cent of crimes of violence or theft.”⁷² The case of Mingeriak is a prime example of the crimes being committed under the influence of alcohol. Mingeriak, an Inuk living in Frobisher Bay, had begun drinking at a local tavern and eventually went to friend’s house, where he demanded sex from the woman inside. A struggle ensued. When the woman’s four-year-old son intervened, Mingeriak stabbed and killed the boy. Mingeriak was sentenced to life in prison. For author Dorothy Harley Eber, the case represented “the new face of crime in the North—a criminal act arising out of the circumstance of the new lifestyle Inuit were beginning to lead.”⁷³

Juvenile delinquency was a growing concern throughout the Northwest Territories. In 1962, a juvenile court judge was appointed for the Eastern Arctic.⁷⁴ Regional Superintendent of Welfare H. Zukerman compiled a report in 1963 dealing specifically with the teenagers of Cape Dorset. The teenagers had little to do, refused to attend school, and had little guidance or direction from the parents. Police had to travel to the community from Lake Harbour (more than 350 km away) to investigate cases in which youth were suspected of vandalism and theft.⁷⁵ The need to bring Cape Dorset’s youth under control no doubt contributed to the establishment of an RCMP detachment there in 1965.

Police also had to address concerns over public safety in the settlements as more Inuit began to live in the settlements and as more whites temporarily relocated to northern settlements. For some residents, roaming packs of sled dogs posed a threat to public safety. No longer used as often, some dogs were left by their Inuit masters to forage through the settlements in search of food. Concerns about dogs attacking women and children resulted in hundreds of dogs being shot by RCMP officers.⁷⁶ In Pangnirtung, one officer shot 250 dogs within a single Arctic summer—a number that represented a quarter of the entire region’s dog population.⁷⁷ The killing of the dogs created, or possibly exaggerated, acrimonious feelings among Inuit towards the RCMP. One Inuk, interviewed by a visiting anthropologist in the late 1950s, questioned whether the police would stop after killing the dogs. Perhaps they would then begin shooting Inuit.⁷⁸

As Inuit moved into the settlements, the perception of government officials towards Inuit society altered. Inuit were more and more seen by the government as town people and less as hunters. Accompanying this was a change in the way the Canadian government expected Inuit to obey the law. Many Inuit practices that had been accepted or at least overlooked in the past

would no longer be tolerated in the new North. For example, in 1963, three young Inuit men were charged with assisting suicide. They had been asked by a respected Elder to assist him in his suicide. The Elder had decided that he no longer wanted to burden the group, and in keeping with traditional Inuit practices decided to kill himself. One of the young men brought him the rifle, another loaded the bullet, and the last cocked the gun. RCMP officer Bob Pilot investigated the crime. He remembers that it was the only time in his career that he had been sent to investigate an assisted suicide. When he voiced his reluctance to pursue the offenders he was told from “higher up” that the time had come for an evolution in northern justice. Pilot was told “this might be a good case to bring to court, with which to bring the law into the community, to show that the police are not just givers of welfare.”⁷⁹

Aviation had a significant impact on the way the RCMP did their job in the Baffin Region and consequently on their relationship with the Inuit. The police had been hitching rides on military flights since they began flying in the Baffin Region during the Second World War. In 1957, the RCMP purchased a deHavilland Otter and stationed it at Frobisher Bay. The RCMP and DNANR shared the craft until 1961, when the police took sole possession of the plane. That same year, a sub-division of the RCMP Air Division was established at Frobisher Bay. Only half of the twelve Baffin settlements had permanent police posts at this point. Air transportation was primarily used to make frequent patrols, transport members between posts, and respond to complaints from distant posts in a timely manner. It increased the police’s presence throughout the Baffin Region. The RCMP’s independent air transportation provided them with a new level of control, prompting one bureaucrat to comment, “This is a far cry from the absentee control which existed for so many years previously.”⁸⁰

Like the airplane, the introduction of the snowmobile into the North forever changed the way the RCMP did their work. In the early 1960s the “ski-dogs,” as they were originally called by the Bombardier Company, were recreation vehicles. Unreliable and dangerous in the Arctic environment, they were prone to break down far from home and, unlike the sled dogs, the snowmobile could not find its way home in a blizzard. By the end of the 1960s, however, technology had improved the reliability and speed of the machines. The RCMP increasingly relied on the snowmobile for local patrols. The RCMP Commissioner’s report of 1967 signalled the end of the dog sled era when it announced that “motorized toboggans can safely replace sleigh dogs at most detachments, promoting efficiency and economy.”⁸¹

The result of these improved transportation systems meant that the RCMP could travel further and faster than they had before. It was easier for them to

monitor events in far-off places and to enforce laws. The RCMP also did not have to rely on Inuit to care for the dog teams and act as guides. Many police reported that their respect for Inuit had grown from observing their land skills and ability to survive. In the years before the planes and snowmobiles, the RCMP were heavily dependent on Inuit for their survival. Removing this dependency by the introduction of technological replacements resulted in a shift in the traditional colonizer-colonized relationship. On the trail Inuit had been in charge. The RCMP had to adapt to Inuit ways, eat Inuit food, sleep in Inuit shelters, travel by Inuit means. The arrival of improved transportation in the North removed the close association between Inuit and the RCMP. Without that relationship, much mutual understanding was lost.

The improvement in communications equipment also removed the police from personal contact with Inuit. By 1960, the medical training course delivered at Charles Camsell hospital had been cancelled because the RCMP were able to contact medical staff along the DEW Line in case of emergencies. The need to patrol to distant HBC posts and remote Inuit camps had also been replaced by the relative ease of picking up a radio set.

The evolution of the RCMP in the Eastern Arctic is inextricably linked to the evolution of the North. First seen by Inuit as a mixture of benefactor and punisher, the RCMP were Canada's closest tie to the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic. Largely autonomous officers stationed in the North were forced to live with the people, to experience their culture and lifestyle. This exposure led to a great respect for the traditional aspects of Inuit society.

As the North grew in importance to the nation, both geostrategically and in terms of resources, the RCMP influence and involvement in the development waned. New agencies arrived to take over and expand the non-police duties the RCMP had been performing for decades. As Inuit moved to the communities to take advantage of housing, education, and health care, they faced the challenges of adapting to a new lifestyle, a challenge that often brought them into confrontation with the police. The social dislocations that occurred in the settlements changed the relationship between Inuit and the RCMP. The northern arm of the force had evolved as well. Officers were exposed to more southerners and had less reason to interact with Inuit socially. Their reliance on Inuit was minimized, transportation and communications advancements replacing the need for Inuit guides. In the 1950s Larsen had rightly said that "in dealing with Eskimo problems we must have a basic understanding of their legal and moral concepts, and of their philosophy of life, in order that we can effectively deal with their problems."⁸² By the 1970s, the burden of understanding was placed on the Inuit.

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Notes

1. See particularly: Sarah Bonesteel and Erik Anderson, *Canada's Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2008); Hugh Brody, *The People's Land: Eskimos and Whites in the Eastern Arctic* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975); David Damas, *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers: The Transformation of Inuit Settlement in the Central Arctic* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); R. Q. Duffy, *The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Inuit Since the Second World War* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); P. W. Lackenbauer and M. Farish, "The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment," *Environmental History* 12, no. 4 (2007): 920–950; *QTC Final Report: Achieving Saimaqatigiingniq* (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Qikiqtani Inuit Association, 2010).
2. William Morrisson, *Showing the Flag* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1985), 162.
3. *Ibid.*, 87–101.
4. Shelagh D. Grant, *Arctic Justice: On Trial for Murder, Pond Inlet, 1923* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). Grant's view that the establishment of a post at Pond Inlet was related to sovereignty concerns has been contested by historians Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes in their work *Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 1918-1925* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 143, fn12.
5. Lyle Dick, *Muskox Land: Elsmere Island in the Age of Contact* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2001); and William Barr, *Red Serge and Polar Bear Pants* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004). More information on the establishment of the force in the Eastern Arctic and Arctic generally can be found in Harwood Steele, *Policing the Arctic: The Story of the Conquest of the Arctic by the Royal Canadian (formerly North-West) Mounted Police* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1936); and Nora and William Kelly, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973).

6. See: Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski, *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939–63* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994); Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953-1955 Relocation* (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1994); and Alan R. Marcus, *Out in the Cold: The Legacy of Canada's Inuit Relocation Experiment in the High Arctic*, IGIA Document 71 (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1992).
7. Mark O. Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Changes, Political Development, and Self Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 29.
8. Ibid.
9. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, RG 18, Acc. 85-86/048, Box 51, Vol T019904(1). Brief form C.B. MacDonnell to J.R. Lemieux, March 23, 1964.
10. Until 1974, the RCMP only hired men to be police officers. For a thoughtful analysis of the types of people (men) that became Mounties in the early part of the twentieth century see Steve Hewitt, *Riding to the Rescue: The Transformation of the RCMP in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1914–1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). For a more theoretical approach to the iconization of the Mountie in Canadian national mythology see Michael Dawson, *The Mountie: From Dime Novel to Disney* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008), Chapter 2.
11. Although it varied yearly, a detachment would conduct on average between three and seven patrols each calendar year; however, in other years they might only conduct one. In 1925, the Pangnirtung detachment completed eleven patrols, including the summer boat patrols and hunting patrols. See LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3668, File G-567-66, pt. 1.
12. R.D. Van Norman, "Life at an Eastern Arctic Detachment," *RCMP Quarterly* (October 1951): 117.
13. For a discussion of the RCMP Patrol Report and the retention of records by the Government of Canada, see Philip Goldring and Madeleine Redfern, Review of the RCMP Report, "The RCMP and the Inuit Sled Dogs" (2006) (Iqaluit, Nunavut, Qikiqtani Truth Commission, 2010), 42–46.
14. Traditional Inuit oil lamp. It provided both light and heat inside of the igloo.
15. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3668, File G-567-69, part 1, Patrol Reports, Pond Inlet – Patrol to Fury and Hecla Strait, April 25, 1923.
16. Wight was a seasoned Arctic veteran who had taken part in the Canadian Arctic Expedition. He was accompanied by Const. T.H. Tregold and Oojoalo and Alope, both Inuit guides. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part 1. Patrol Report, Pangnirtung Detachment, Patrol from Cumberland Gulf to Lake Harbour, May 31, 1926.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. The patrol report is surprisingly silent on the investigation of the murdered Inuk.
21. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3668, File G-567-69, part 1. Patrol Reports, Pond Inlet – Patrol to Home Bay, Baffin Island, May 8, 1930 and Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part 1, Patrol Report – Patrol from Pangnirtung to West side of Nettilling Lake and Return, October 30, 1925.
22. The RCMP were never the primary givers of welfare in the region; instead, the Government of Canada had quietly accepted that the HBC and missionaries could provide those services. See Richard Diubaldo, *The Government of Canada and the Inuit, 1900–1967* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1985); Diamond Jenness, *Eskimo Administration: II Canada*, Technical Paper No. 14 (Montreal: Arctic Institute of North America, 1964).
23. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46. Part 1, Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Patrol – Lake Harbour to Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island and Return, March 17, 1938; and Patrol Report – Lake Harbour to Frobisher Bay, Mingoaktook, Siniyah and return to Lake Harbour, May 6, 1930.
24. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46. Part 1. Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Patrol to Native Camp Noodloo, and Pritzler Harbour, February 7, 1941.
25. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part 1. Patrol Reports, Pangnirtung, Patrol from Pangnirtung detachment to native settlement of Padle and Kivitoo and Return. January 31, 1926; and LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46, part 1. Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Patrol from Lake Harbour to Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island, September 20, 1934.
26. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46. Part 1. Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Hunting Patrol from Lake Harbour to Laks Land and return, October 22, 1934.
27. This is starkly contrasted with the Janes case. Free Trader Robert Janes had been murdered in 1920 by Nookdlah after Janes had begun acting erratically and locals grew afraid of him. In 1922, a judicial party was sent to north Baffin to preside over three Inuit accused of murder. Nookdlah was found guilty by the judicial party and sentenced to time served; his two accomplices were found not guilty. As Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes point out, the imposition of justice in this matter was largely a result of pressure and opportunity. Janes' father was pressuring the government to look into the murder and a northern patrol had already been scheduled for that year. Cavell and Noakes, *Acts of Occupation*, 143, fn 12.
28. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3668, File G-567-69, part 1, Patrol Reports, Pond Inlet, Patrol to Foxe Basin, Admiralty Inlet and Navy Board Inlet, 17 April 1929. And LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part 1, Patrol Reports, Pangnirtung, Patrol from Pangnirtung to Keeveetoo, Padlee and return, January 31, 1925.
29. Peter Keith Kulchyski and Frank J. Tester, *Kiumajut (Talking Back): Game Management and Inuit Rights, 1900–70* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 36.

30. For example see: LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part. 1, Patrol Reports, Pangnirtung, Patrol from Pangnirtung detachment to native settlement of Padle and Kivitoo and Return. January 31, 1926.
31. Grant, *Arctic Justice*, 72–80.
32. Grant, Shelagh. *Niaqutiaq* (Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, 2000), Accessed May 26, 2011, <http://www.biographi.ca>.
33. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46, part 1. Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Patrol to Cape Dorset and Return. February 5, 1938. Nascopie was the HBC supply ship. There is no further information as to what happened to the Inuk.
34. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46, part 1. Patrol Report – Patrol from Lake Harbour to Frobisher Bay District, September 25, 1939.
35. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 3665, File G567-46, part 1. Patrol Reports, Lake Harbour, Patrol from Lake Harbour to Amadjuak Vicinity and return, September 25, 1935.
36. LAC, RG 18, Vol. Vol. 3667, File G-567-66, part 1, Patrol to Blacklead Island. February 28, 1926.
37. Brody, *The People's Land*, 158–159.
38. Morrison, *Showing the Flag*, 152–161.
39. Grant, *Arctic Justice*, 232.
40. Ibid.
41. R.S. Pilot, “Special Constable Kyak,” *RCMP Quarterly* (October 1972): 7.
42. Ibid.
43. See K.R. Greenaway and Moira Dunbar, “Aviation in the Arctic Islands” in *A Century of Canada's Arctic Islands, 1880-1980*, ed. Morris Zaslow (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1981), 79–92; Maxime Bégin, “Inuit Memories of the Early Fox Main DEW Line Station (Hall Beach)” in *Proceedings of the Second IPSSAS Seminar*, Iqaluit, Nunavut, 2003; Lackenbauer and Farish, *The Cold War on Canadian Soil*, 2007; and LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985-86/048. Vol. 55, File TA 500-8-1-11. Conditions Amongst the Eskimos – Pangnirtung. Memo to Officer Commanding from Corporal C.G. Barr, re: Economic Conditions of Eskimos Living at or near DEW Line sites. March 22, 1957.
44. On the early 1950s, see for example Tester and Kulchyski, *Tammarniit*; Duffy, *Road to Nunavut*; Damas, *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers*; Jenness, *Eskimo Administration: II*; Richard J. Diubaldo, *A Historical Overview of Government-Inuit Relations, 1900–1980s* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1992); R. Gordon Robertson, *Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant: Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); and Mark O. Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992).
45. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent used this phrase in the House of Commons on December 8, 1953 to describe Canada's historic approach to governance

- in the Arctic. In John David Hamilton, *Arctic Revolution: Social Change in the Northwest Territories, 1935–1994* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1994), 57.
46. Peter Clancy, "The Making of Eskimo Policy in Canada, 1952–62: The Life and Times of the Eskimo Affairs Committee" *Arctic*, 40, no. 3 (1987): 195.
 47. Clancy, 191.
 48. Northwest Territories Archives, 263, Alexander Stevenson fonds, Accession N-1992-023, Box 24, File 9, Relief Food Shortages, 1951-1960. Memo to the Commissioner, RCMP from H.A. Larsen, Insp. re: Responsibility, Care and Supervision of Eskimos, 30 October 1951.
 49. Duffy, *Road to Nunavut*, 16; and Gordon Robertson, *Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant: Mackenzie King to Pierre Elliot Trudeau* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001): 117–120.
 50. In this article the term "welfare" refers to a range of services that the police provided to help improve both the physical and material well-being of Inuit.
 51. The primary function of the NSO was to improve economic conditions for Inuit.
 52. LAC, RG 22, Indian and Northern Affairs. A-1-a, Vol. 870. File 40-8-24, part 2. Eskimo Women (Relations With) Memo to Deputy Minister from B.G. Sivertz, re: T.J. Whitfield. May 12, 1961 and Exchange of notes (May 5, 1955) between Canada and the United States of America to Govern the Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System in Canadian Territory, Canada Treaty Series, 1955/8, (Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery: Ottawa, 1955).
 53. In the early 1950s the RCMP began submitting "Conditions Amongst the Eskimos" reports. These reports were standardized with several topics including game, population, clothing, hunting equipment and dogs, health, and intermarriage. They provide a unique snapshot into a period of intense transformation in the Eastern Arctic.
 54. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985-86/048. Vol. 55, File TA 500-8-1-11. Conditions Amongst the Eskimos – Pangnirtung. Memo to Officer Commanding from Corporal C.G. Barr, re: Economic Conditions of Eskimos Living at or near DEW Line sites, March 22, 1957.
 55. L.H. Nicholson, "The Problem of the People," *The Beaver* 289 (Spring 1959): 24.
 56. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985-86/048. Vol. 51, File T-127-1 (1960) Motion of Appreciation to the Commission for his opening Address by L.H. Nicholson. Ottawa, Jan 26th, 1959.
 57. Ibid.
 58. Nicholson, "The Problem of the People," 24.
 59. NWT, 263, N-1992-023n, Box 17. Memorandum for Field Staff for Information from Ben Sivertz, Director. March 11, 1959.
 60. "The Commissioner," *RCMP Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (July 1951): 3.

61. Nora H. Kelly, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: a Century of History, 1873–1973* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1973), 226.
62. Nicholson resigned from the force after the government refused to provide the RCMP support in the Newfoundland loggers strike.
63. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1983-84/321, Vol. 39, G292-1 (1959), Memorandum to the D.A.O from L.H. Nicholson, December 29, 1958.
64. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985-86/048, Vol. 51, File t-100-4(1), Brief for Deputy Commissioner J.R. Lemieux by C.B. Macdonell, C. Supt., Commanding “G” Division, March 23, 1964.
65. LAC, RG 85, Vol. 1382, File 1013-9, part 7, Eskimo Affairs Committee, Report for the Committee on Eskimo Affairs, April 02, 1962.
66. The term “Policy of Dispersal” was coined in David Damas’ account of modernization in the Eastern Arctic. Damas, *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers*, Chapter 2.
67. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985/86-048, Vol. 51. Advisory Committee on Northern Development. Letter to Commissioner from W.G. Fraser, O.C. “G” Division. Re: Government Activities in the North – 1961. February 5, 1962.
68. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985/86-048, Vol. 51. Advisory Committee on Northern Development. Letter to G.W. Rowley, Secretary, ACND from C.W. Harvison, Commissioner, RCMP. January 25, 1963.
69. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985/86-048, Vol. 51. Advisory Committee on Northern Development. Letter to Commissioner from W.G. Fraser, O.C. “G” Division. Re: Government Activities in the North – 1961. February 5, 1962.
70. LAC, RG 85, Vol. 80, File 201-1, pt. 26, Eastern Arctic Patrol, Memo to A. Stevenson, From G.E.B. Sinclair, n.d.
71. Curt Taylor Griffiths et al. “Policing the Baffin Region: Findings from the Baffin Region Crime and Justice Study” (Burnaby, BC: Criminology Research Centre, n.d.), accessed November 10, 2009, <http://www.justiceexpert.com>.
72. Dorothy Harley Eber, *Images of Justice* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 153–154.
73. *Ibid.*, 125.
74. LAC, RG 18, Acc. 1985/86-048, Vol. 51. Advisory Committee on Northern Development. Letter to Commissioner from W.G. Fraser, O.C. “G” Division. Re: Government Activities in the North – 1961. February 5, 1962.
75. LAC, RG 85, D.1.a, Vol. 1360, File 252-5/166. Pt.1, Eskimo Welfare – Cape Dorset. Report on Teenagers in Cape Dorset by H. Zukerman. January 25, 1963.
76. Qikiqtani Truth Commission, QTC Final Report, 21-25; and LAC, Northern Affairs Program, RG 85, Vol. 1473, File 201-1-8, pt. 6, Report by P. Godt, Acting Chief, Co-operative Development.
77. LAC, RG 18, Vol. 55, File TA 500-8-1-11, Conditions Amongst the Eskimos – Pangnirtung, Memo from J.S. Grabowski, January 1, 1967.

78. Toshio, Yatsushiro, "The Changing Eskimo," *The Beaver* (Summer 1962): 22.
79. Although the three had pleaded guilty, Judge Sissons suspended their sentences. See Eber, *Images of Justice*, 133.
80. RG 85, Northern Affairs Program, Vol. 1382, File 1012-9, pt. 7, Eskimo Affairs Committee (Booklet of Instructions, Minutes and Agendas), Report for the Committee on Eskimo Affairs, April 2, 1962.
81. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1967* (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1968), 35.
82. LAC, Indian and Northern Affairs, RG 22, A-1-a, Vol. 334, File 40-8-1, part 11. Eskimos - General (Conference on Eskimo Affairs). Letter to R.G. Robertson, Deputy Minister from L.H. Nicholson, Commissioner, RCMP, re: recent reports of conditions at Frobisher Bay. February 27, 1959.