Re: mapping the Arctic:
The Problematization of Cartographic Discourse in John Moss' Enduring Dreams and Rudy Wiebe's A Discovery of Strangers

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How can we make maps “speak” about the social worlds of the past?
– J.B. Harley

Understanding history as a cultural construct rather than as an objective truth continues to gain favour in contemporary writing, and has proven to be largely liberating for a wide range of ex-centric cultures that have been misappropriated and silenced by “official” histories. Similarly, many authors of postmodern fiction have become conscious of the historicity of their own fiction-making and no longer limit themselves to formalist patternings of theme and image, but, instead, deepen their “engagement with the social and historical world” (Hutcheon 1), particularly with the (re)production of knowledge and power. In light of this revisioning of history and fiction, “(hi)story” (Kloss 56), I wish to discuss how the Canadian Arctic has been written as a marginalized colonial acquisition, its “(hi)story” in part an imposition of maps that embody a specific textuality of meaning, and how postmodern fiction, with its engagement with and rupture of history’s pretence of objective disinterestedness, offers resistance to this levelling of cultural difference. With a focus on John Moss' Enduring Dreams and Rudy Wiebe's A Discovery of Strangers, I will address the need for a (re)cognition of maps as mental constructs and outline an imaginative space wherein the Arctic can be (re)membered as physical experience and as a panoply of voices.

Contrary to popular belief, cartography does not simply reflect objective truths revealed by the clarity of an unbiased scientific lens, rather it embodies a discourse wherein “a series of key rhetorical strategies implemented in the production of the map, such as the reinscription, enclosure and hierarchization of space... provide an analogue for the acquisition, management and reinforcement of colonial power” (Huggan 115). Maps do not reveal, they occlude; maps do not reflect, they invent. Maps are “images
with historically specific codes” (Harley 277), “refracted images contributing to dialogue in a socially constructed world” (Harley 278) that the colonized, deterritorialized subject must endure as an imposition.

Both in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon particular sets of social relations. (Harley 278)

The inherent historic and cultural specificity of maps derives from a particular perspective that perceives itself as universal truth. As a result, other cultural world-views might well find maps as alien and meaningless as Keskarrah does in A Discovery of Strangers when he sketches a map on the bare earth only “after a deal of hesitation” (Wiebe 42). This hesitation, however, provides a gap through which we can read the cultural difference the conceptual order of the map fails to represent and through which we can understand and value why the native peoples Franklin’s expedition encounters “seem unable to understand anything of the principles of ‘property’” (Wiebe 43). In short, the map becomes an abstraction that hides the hallmarks of its own cultural production at the same time it aspires to objective representation:

Cartographic discourse... is... characterized by the discrepancy between its authoritative status and its approximate function, a discrepancy which marks out the “recognizable totality” of the map as a manifestation of the desire for control rather than as an authenticating seal of coherence. The “uniformity” of the map, therefore, becomes the subject of a proposition rather than a statement of fact; moreover, this proposition comes to be identified with the “mimetic fallacy” through which an approximate, subjectively reconstituted historically contingent model of the “real” world is passed off as an accurate, objectively presented and universally applicable copy. (Huggan 117-118)

This “mimetic fallacy,” however, is not a harmless aesthetic concern of representation since the map-makers embody and reproduce the dominant discourse of their political, cultural, economic and military motivations. As J. B. Harley asserts, “maps are preeminently a language of power, not of protest” (301), a “teleological discourse, reifying power, reinforcing the status quo, and freezing social interaction within chartered lines” (302-3). This said, the recovery of cultural difference through the gap provided by Keskarrah’s hesitation or the “mimetic fallacy” of cartographic discourse engenders an imaginative (re)membering of the Arctic texts such as Moss' Enduring Dreams and Wiebe’s A Discovery of Strangers explore.

The map, then, not only represents colonial power, but also an experiential framework of a culture that seeks to impose its own narrative on the
world. As Keskarrah muses:

Nothing stays the way it is, everything changes when... [the whites]... come, and they can use it... They're always making marks, marks on paper that any drop of water can destroy. As if they had no memory. (Wiebe 75)

The white explorers hinge their interactions with the world through abstract representations, a symbolic system that holds no meaning for Keskarrah's experiential reality. In Enduring Dreams, John Moss echoes this distinction between systems of knowing, the notion that "maps are not the same as memories" (27), and, in doing so, draws attention to the sheer textuality of meaning through which colonial discourse effectively codifies and commodifies experience under an ideology of efficiency, order and empirical will:

Sequence, connectedness, notions of temporality derive from text: inchoate senses are obtrusive; maps replace dreams; books, memories; history, tradition; and geography, the landscape. (Moss 36)

Like Wiebe, Moss seeks to recover cultural difference effaced from maps as a source of cultural value rather than replicating the imposition of an homogenous, exclusive and excluding "grand narrative." In this, Moss and Wiebe realize their imaginative (re)membering of alterity, of cultural difference, in a particularly post-colonial fashion wherein their texts empower dialogue and enable political resistance to the assimilation and silencing of difference that lies at the core of an imperialist cartographic discourse. Moss and Wiebe insist on the cultural specificity of the cartographic discourse subscribed to by the white colonisers who "sometime, somewhere, ... decided to believe this simplicity of mark, and they will live their lives straight to the end believing that" (Wiebe 147). Yet this "simplicity of mark" also carries with it the "imperatives of commerce, politics ... [and] ideology" (Moss 105), the power of colonial oppression. As suggested, Moss and Wiebe strive to create an imaginative space as a site of resistance to dominant paradigms, an attempt "to mediate between the Arctic and the outside, to transform themselves into Arctic landscape, and not the other way around" (Moss 129), and a challenge to western culture's institutionalized hierarchy of "geography [that] has displaced the landscape; misplaced it, perhaps" (Moss 17). Explorers and their narratives "failed to enter the landscape" (Moss 17) due to an innate sense of superiority, and their successors, the legion of map-makers, fail in a similar fashion:

Others came, geographers; searching for place, looking for limits—and in their random wake a skein of patterns formed between the old worlds and the new, and as they named the landscape, measured it, marked it on maps, they brought it into line. Naming gave significance to their efforts, conferred meaning on the
Arctic, made of barriers boundaries (rooted in fear), and of boundaries, barriers (rooted in ignorance). None had much interest in the Arctic itself. They were more concerned with north, how to make it relative and absolute. How to relate it to where they came from; how to get over it. (Moss 17-18)

As a result the Inuit, Inuit toponymy and the Arctic landscape are silenced, oppressed and catalogued under an empirical and imperial gaze, and under the weight of a transposed history.

Although the imaginative recovery of cultural difference constructs a space that allows the questioning and problematization of maps and cartographic discourse in general, the identification of the map’s totalizing tendency involves more than Birdseye’s recognition of the colonizer’s “simplicity of mark” (Wiebe 147). Any new understanding of the map brought about its deconstruction must be accompanied by a rethinking of the ideological undercurrents that legitimate the map’s power. Graham Huggan expresses this need for social engagement as the need for both “de- and reterritorialization” (124) of the Arctic through the contestation of dominant cultural paradigms. In this role, “the cartographic connection can therefore be considered to provide the provisional link which joins the contestory theories of post-structuralism and post-colonialism in the pursuit of social and cultural change” (Huggan 128). Both Moss and Wiebe envision the possibility for “social and cultural change” through resistance to the imperialistic cultural paradigm that drives map-making:

A cultural paradigm collects the scattered practices of a group, unified them into coherent possibilities for action, and holds them up to the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of that exemplar. Works of art, when performing this function, are not merely representations or symbols, but actually produce a shared understanding. (Dreyfus 298)

For “works of art” read “maps” produced within a dominant culture whose ideological intent involves the acquisition of further territories and subjects. In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Martin Heidegger identifies western culture’s technological paradigm which strives to order “that which is not yet at our disposal to use efficiently (e.g., the wilderness, friendship, and stars) ... [so they can] be brought under our control, and turned into a resource” (Dreyfus 302). This technological paradigm, then, presents a world-view, an ideology, wherein empirical data-gathering orders resources into a “standing reserve” (Heidegger 17) which “assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric ... [that] whatever stand by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object” (Heidegger 17). As a result, Heidegger argues, such ordering has an insidious effect:

Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own
conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve. (Heidegger 19)

For the purposes of my argument I wish to underline what Heidegger conceives as the fundamental levelling effect caused by the “objectlessness of standing-reserve”; that is, how the margin, in this case the Arctic landscape and its people, are robbed of their difference and their culturally specific “voice” by cartographic discourse, itself a manifestation of the technological paradigm.

John Moss clearly articulates the effect of this technological paradigm in which “the Arctic [is] reduced by geographic explication to ciphers, digits, points that occupy no space, lines with no dimension; words shatter, become facts” (Moss 9), causing the Arctic to disappear into the objectlessness of Heidegger’s standing reserve. Similarly, in Wiebe’s text, with its focus on John Franklin’s search for a Northwest Passage, the technological abstraction at the core of map-making constitutes symbolic meaning and being that renders physical suffering as unimportant compared to the hunger of the empirical gaze:

[Even the] drawings [are] as essential as the magnetic-needle readings and declensions, the endless longitudes and latitudes, the flora and fauna, the tem-peratures and lists of aurora borealis sightings they have each, separately, recorded so meticulously day by day despite notebooks lost and other indescribably difficulties and hardships endured. (Wiebe 142)

Franklin’s expedition pursues the desire to map and colonize the Arctic in the face of “an austerity of ice, unnecessary to number or explain or record—or struggle to mirror somehow in a lined notebook” (Wiebe 159). Even when Robert Hood slowly starves to death he clings to demonstrations of will as though to contain and order the landscape and physical experience:

   Michel can drag him on his buffalo robe . . . and . . . [Hood] will write out the calculations, fill all the pages he still has, they are all somewhere safe, pages with numbers and formulas and the exact mathematical sequences of magnetic declension he knows better then the beat of his blood, numbers upon and over then numbers, its grey plateau exact as distance. (Wiebe 229)

Wiebe’s depiction of the Franklin Expedition expresses this levelling as imperial arrogance towards experience and physical landscape, epitomized by Franklin’s “thoroughly planned, ordered and methodical” (Wiebe 47) mind that cannot accept that the Inuit (and the Arctic) could “exist here ages before they were known of” (Wiebe 68). The Expedition relies on its empirical constructs, bringing into being the Arctic landscape and its inhabitants via
maps and data. As Moss suggests:

The Arctic of outsiders is a landscape of the mind, shaped more in the imagination by reading than by experience and perception. (For those who read, the dichotomy between knowledge and experience invariably resolves in favour of knowledge. Nothing do we find so real as written words.) For those who have never been to the Arctic, this is the only northern reality they know, this world gleaned in fragments from narrative accounts by explorers and adventurers, scientists and artists; by all who endeavoured to capture in words those awesome ineffable spaces and plains in which they are alien, and often of which they are more than a little afraid. (Moss 28)

Hood’s rationalizing arrogance, his recourse to written words, constitutes a failure to recognize the experiential framework that Moss self-consciously writes about: “perception and notation are functions of experience; not being, itself. You may situate yourself in landscape, within the landscape. You are not in a privileged position; you are landscape” (Moss 17). Moss’ emphasis on the subjectivity of any narrative contains an implicit (re)cognition that the imposed map does not end with the death of foolhardy imperial “discovers”; rather the “simplicity of mark” (Wiebe 147) endures, becomes a codified representation of ownership, control and order. As a result, it is this imperialist ideology with its technological, cartographic discourse that generates early Arctic explorers’ grim determination, arrogance, and “anger . . . that perceives the world in vertical configuration, and affinity with nature an affront” (Moss 70).

Throughout *Enduring Dreams*, John Moss consistently addresses the futility and self-destructive arrogance of technological will that pits mental constructs against remorseless Arctic winters. The immediacy of experience, of physical suffering, are sacrificed for the “higher good” of an abstract paradigm that strives to render the Arctic in terms of its “storage capacity” (Giddens 94) of material resources (much like Heidegger’s standing-reserve), in order to be manipulated by the colonizers’ “storage of authoritative resources [that] involves above all the retention and control of information or knowledge” (Giddens 94). This control of authoritative sources is embodied in state-endorsed cartography and emphasises the cultural difference between the colonizers, who cannot understand the Arctic without “map lines . . . placed around the landscape, [without] boundaries inscribed to contain” (Moss 75), and the Inuit for whom “landscape is an extension of being, as intimate and far-reaching as genealogy, an existential fact” (Moss 29). Indeed, Moss argues, “traditional Inuit had no geographers. They were in the Arctic before it was north, before distance and direction fell into line; before north took hold and they became remote” (Moss 3). Moss’ differentiation between pre- and post-
contact Arctic culture contradicts Robin McGrath’s suggestion that the “Inuit have a long history of map-making” (McGrath 6), an on-going tradition in which Inuit map-makers, much like contemporary Inuit writers, carvers, seamstresses, print-makers and the like, “draw on their ancestors to give meaning and integrity to their work” (McGrath 8). These are problematic assertions, but McGrath readily concludes:

It is unlikely, therefore, that modern examples of illustrated map-making world would be totally divorced from tradition, particularly since Inuit map-making was a highly prized skill in the pre-contact era and one which, like art and composition, crossed the barriers of age and sex. (McGrath 8)

If we are to accept McGrath’s claim that maps are an indigenous element of Inuit culture, then we must (re)cogize the idea of the map, understand the map as something other than the symbolic power wester culture invests in the graphic rendition of space, which McGrath fails to do. If “Inuit maps are still a mystery to most collectors” (McGrath 10), then that is so because we are still reading them through the lens of a colonizing, technological paradigm, the need to produce symbolic representations of the real through the ordering and collation of data. In fact, McGrath stumbles on an intimation of difference which she subsequently fails to address when she distinguishes between “ephemeral maps” (McGrath 6) comprised of “outlines on sand or snow, using rocks, bones and sticks, to give a three dimensional quality to their images” (McGrath 6) and maps as evinced by western culture:

For centuries, however, explorers, whalers and traders also relied upon the cartographic skills of Inuit they encountered, and examples of these maps on paper by Inuit can still be found in museums and archives. (McGrath 6)

Clearly, these two “types” of maps are distinct and embody different cultural paradigms, of a pre-contact Inuit world view and the technological paradigm of the “collaborative” efforts respectively.

Robin McGrath’s negligence in identifying the cultural difference silenced by maps echoes the argument of one of her major sources, *Eskimo Maps from the Canadian Eastern Arctic*. The writers of this volume, John Spink and D. W. Moodie, are geographers firmly grounded in the cartographic discourse of their discipline. They suggest that map-making represents an ongoing Inuit tradition and bemoan the “impermanence of most . . . [Inuit] media” (7), but still make sweeping assumptions through the effective deployment of half-truths:

In some of the maps the particular Eskimo *may have* attempted to reproduce his own environment in terms of the mode of representation suggested to him by the outsider. Certainly in terms of media, the use of pencil, charcoal, or ink upon
parchment and paper was foreign to the Eskimo. But leaving this divergence aside, the line drawings which were produced, in many cases when the "primitive" was little influenced by the collector, cannot have been so dissimilar from the line drawings in wood, sand and snow. (Spink and Moodie 7, emphasis added)

Notice how the cartographers’ vested interests are preserved: the casual suggestion that an outsider “may have” had some influence, the selective criteria that discards “this divergence,” and the emphatic assertion that map-making “cannot” be anything other than an indigenous tradition. Such is objective truth. Spink and Moodie, it seems, much like McGrath, cannot conceive an Inuit “map” in any other way than relative to western cultural conventions enshrined in their discipline, a perspective that continues to reproduce the ideological apparatus of colonialism today in a purportedly multicultural society.

John Moss articulates these distinctions through highlighting how “the Inuit, who name the landscape sparingly and in words descriptive of their experience there or for its salient features, have little history...as...the landscape is who they are” (Moss 109-110), a cultural paradigm marginalized by imperial map-making that “draws lines of knowledge, of sovereignty, and of intent to separate the native peoples from their natural environment” (Moss 75). The Inuit, Moss relates:

Could read maps without reference to north; could hold the landscape in their minds without respect to measured distance or direction, and reproduce its configuration to exact scale from their own experience in the world; not symbolism but the shapes of consciousness. (Moss 7)

Inuit history, then, becomes subsumed by imperial grand narrative simply because the Inuit did not produce historical accounts and maps that symbolically produce power through the management of material and cultural resources and through the “boundary lines on the map...as...a medium of appropriation which those unlearned in geometrical survey methods found impossible to challenge” (Harley 285). In A Discovery of Strangers, Wiebe asserts that “every place already was its true and exact name. Birdseye and Keskarrah between them knew the land, each name a story complete in their heads” (24); moreover, Keskarrah “could draw, very carefully, the places he knew through his fingers from behind his eyes onto the ground, which is where all land already lies fully and complete, though hidden” (Wiebe 24). There is a very real difference between what McGrath identifies “ephemeral maps” that remain part of the landscape and maps produced as a “political force in society” (Harley 279); a difference between a biocentric vision founded on experience and survival, and an egocentric flexing of will that renders territory as an abstraction capable of being possessed.

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Cultural difference, then, is subsumed by cartographic discourse into notions of cultural hierarchy, and thus constitutes a failure to value the intrinsic worth of the Inuit world-view. As soon as “geography defines the Arctic relative to Greenwich” (Moss 16), there arises a cultural levelling historically transcribed as the “map [which] gave its imperial users an arbitrary power that was easily divorced from the social responsibilities and consequences of its exercise” (Harley 282). As a result, the idea of nation and of cultural hegemony become constructs specific to a particular group who has access to modes of (re)production of knowledge and symbolic power:

Identity construction becomes part of an (imperial) master narrative that is based on erasure rather than the acknowledgment of difference, whereby the inventiveness of this (literary) invention of identity is, of course, never questioned. (Kloss 68)

Cartographic discourse colonizes through the levelling of difference, so that “everything written on the Canadian Arctic is, in effect, a northwest passage, the expression not only of traditions but the geography and history of another world” (Moss 40), and the Franklin Expedition epitomizes this conceptual imposition:

The genial character of Franklin’s account is periodically interspersed with . . . readings of established points, proving them through celestial divination to be precisely where they are; connecting then mathematically to where he has come from and where he is going; fixed points within his narrative, increments on his journey between anticipation and achievement, from England abroad and to England again. (Moss 59)

Franklin charts and maps imperial design and empirical will, “the world . . . always wrong because they never want it to be . . . the way it is” (Wiebe 132), dismembering native voice and landscape, substituting experience for text, “tam[ing phenomena]. . . with a blurred sound, . . . content not to recognize what they can see; to ignore what the wind is breathing over them” (Wiebe 166). As J. B. Harley suggests, “in colonial mapping . . . [even] . . . silences on maps may also be regarded as discrimination against native peoples” (292) by way of rendering their presence as an abstraction:

They foster the notion of a socially empty space. The abstract quality of the map . . . lessens the burden of conscience about people in the landscape. Decisions about the exercise of power are removed from the realm of immediate face-to-face contacts. (Harley 303)

This distancing is an antithesis to Inuit culture’s connectivity between people and place, and embodies an Arctic that expresses “alien imperatives and dreams” (Moss 29); it is this silencing, this erasure and levelling, that Moss
and Wiebe attempt to rupture through their imaginative sites of contestation wherein we are invited to (re)member the landscape and the voices alive within it, a strategy of resistance to a dominant culture that still perceives the map as disinterested scientific fact, its ideology as universal truth.

Ideology never tells the truth about itself; its cultural productions continuously mirror and mask the impetus behind economics, politics, and Expedition's "grand attempt to rename the entire country" (Wiebe 13). At no point can the white "explorers" realize the implications of their appropriations—neither the self-destructive solipsism of their imposed narratives, "their own telling, as told to themselves" (Wiebe 15), nor how the imposition of their own technological paradigm destroys cultural difference. Heidegger suggests that western culture must relinquish the futile technological struggle to order the world:

The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. . . . The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control. (Heidegger 5)

The issue is not Franklin's introduction of rifles, let us say, but rather the imposition of another world-view, a different cultural paradigm whose ideological ends utilize people and landscape as a resource. As Dreyfus comments, "Heidegger's concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies" (305). Wiebe's (re)membered Keskarrah voices a post-colonial critique of this cultural levelling, and, in doing so, offers a vision of social and cultural change that appreciates cultural difference:

Hey! a story can tangle you up so badly you start to think different. I think these strange Whitemud stories could be strong enough to tie us down—though I should be old enough by now to have heard everything at least once. (Wiebe 127)

Moss' and Wiebe's texts collapse history to recover voice, to (re)member the Arctic silenced by maps, the will to mastery, and the cultural hierarchy of colonialism. Both Moss and Wiebe's narratives embody the possibility for change, "whereas political multiculturalism is largely the result of another centralist, i.e., Ottawa-based approach towards Canadian identity, multiculturalism in literature has its roots in an ex-centric, namely peripheral or regional consciousness" (Kloss 74). They insist on the need for an ideological/paradigmatic shift, a strategy that lends itself to Graham Huggen's understanding of the use of maps in post-colonial writing:

The role of cartography in . . . post-colonial writing . . . cannot be solely envi-
aged as the reworking of a particular spatial paradigm, but consists rather in the implementation of a series of creative revisions which register the transition from a colonial framework within which the writer is compelled to recreate and reflect upon the restrictions of colonial space to a post-colonial one within which he or she acquires the freedom to engage in a series of "territorial disputes" which implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the relativity of modes of spatial (and, by extension, cultural) perception. (Huggan 127-128)

The totality of imposed narrative embodies, then, is "not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being" (Dreyfus 305); that is, we must undergo a (re)cognition of the essence of technology as embodied in the map in order to engender a (re)membering of the Arctic, a cultural space in which eccentric narrative and place can shrug off cartographic annexation. Heidegger emphasizes a resistance to the technological paradigm through an appreciation of marginality, those "practices [that] remain marginal precisely because they resist efficiency" (Dreyfus 310), because they resist the cultural levelling of cartographic discourse. Moss and Wiebe endeavour to create an imaginative space in order to explore a new understanding of being distinct from the marginalizing tendency of cartographic discourse, which would in turn de-emphasize the colonizing centre and allow a space for pluralistic world-views rooted in place, the very antithesis of technological efficiency. Here lies the difference between deconstructive play and post-colonial responsibility, wherein the decolonization of the map promises to "revision the map itself as the expression of a shifting ground between alternate metaphors rather than as the approximate representation of a 'literal truth'" (Huggan 125), a (re)cognition of colonized space in which the re-territorialization of a (re)membered Arctic place can be envisioned. When Moss writes that "in a world with no centre, everything is marginal" (18), he does not call for endless relativism, but rather a new response from the reader to envisage a new world map founded on a cultural paradigm of difference rather than the technological efficiency of an imposed, homogenous culture.

Throughout this discussion of the Arctic map as construct and ideology lying behind its construction, the links between cartography and history have been understood to be practically indivisible. As J. B. Harley suggests, "like the historian, the map-maker has always played a rhetorical role in defining the configurations of power in society as well as recording their manifestations in the visible landscape" (Harley 303) to the extent that "any cartographic history which ignores the political significance of representation relegates itself to an 'ahistorical' history" (I Harle 303). Similarly, the metafictional strategies of post-colonial writing that engage history and maps, for example, indicates a "literature that is openly aware of the fact that it is written and
read as part of a particular culture, having as much to do with the literary past as with the social present” (Hutcheon 1); a literature that questions and problematizes not for the sake of an ultimately paralysing concept of scepticism, but in order to replace “the universal (but somehow male) concept of humanist Man . . . [with] a more diversified concept of experience based on difference” (Hutcheon 18). Rudy Wiebe’s multiplicity of voice (male/female, white/native, upper and lower classes) in A Discovery of Strangers stresses the subjectivity of “(hi)story” and of maps, and extols Wiebe’s understanding and practice of historiographic metafiction:

Wiebe conceives of the writer’s task as a process in which the artist gets so closely involved in the events he deals with that a real separation between the writer as subject and history as object is no longer possible. Subsequently, Wiebe employs an almost indigenous, orally defined concept of historiographic writing, in which fact and fiction do not appear as an antimony but are treated as synonyms. (Kloss 76)

Such an assessment of Wiebe applies equally to Enduring Dreams, in that Moss is continually aware of the tradition out of which he writes, the lens he cannot help but see through: “I write this/as an outsider, native only to geography:/a visitor, for a while less remote” (Moss 27). This is an individual and authentic voice aware of its metafictionality, a voice at once multivalent and singular.

In these words, set now in this way of passing, there is no centre; there are no margins; no borders. This is not a geography of the imagination, or of the soul or mind. It is an essay of words; essay as landscape. Fiction; as all writing is; it is fiction. (Moss 26)

In a similar way I have, at all turns, been confronted by the Arctic’s textuality in my textual exploration of cartographic impositions, and by the need to recognize my own limited and limiting cultural lenses. I have not brought closure, but dis-closure, an attempt to outline an imaginative space of resistance to an ideology that uses cartography to censure, silence, and erase cultural difference in order to control, order, and possess. I have spliced together narratives so as to underline how a fundamental (re)cognition of maps, that is a simultaneous understanding of maps as empirical constructs and the need to rethink their form and function, can allow a (re)membering of the Arctic as landscape and people expressed by cultural productions of difference. True this is still an “imaginative space,” but, as Moss and Wiebe repeatedly suggest, assert and evoke, it also embodies the beginnings of social and cultural change and the recovery of a pluralistic map that allows voices and stories to crowd in.

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Note

1. The use of parenthesises in "(re)cognition" and "(re)membering" is not mere word play but an attempt to express a viable contestation of dominant modes of ideological thinking. By "(re)cognition" I wish to suggest that maps as produced and consecrated by western culture are mental constructs and must be recognized as such; by "(re)membering" I wish to invite the possibility for stories given voice by the recovery of cultural difference, and also imply that the abstract notion of discourse must remain rooted in the people that constitute a culture and populate a region. These resonant words, then, provide the key for the discussion that follows.

Bibliography


