Glacier Bay National Monument, The Tlingit, and the Artifice of Wilderness

THEODORE R. CATTON

The national park idea has not been kind to indigenous peoples. Americans traditionally thought of national parks as natural and scenic preserves where the only human presence was that of park visitors who "take only pictures and leave only footprints." Native inhabitants who hunted, fished, and gathered wild foods in these areas were anathema to the parks' purpose. The park-builders—conservationists, boosters, park concessionaires, and the National Park Service itself—commemorated Native people's past occupation and use of these areas by their diligent preservation of Indian names on the parks' landforms, or by the prominent place they gave to Indian curios in the tourist shops, or the recounting of local Indian myths during evening campfire programs.

As living cultures, however, with an abiding interest in the land, Indian peoples received much less consideration. The national parks' caretakers systematically screened Indian peoples out of the parks and, since national parks were dedicated to the preservation of nature, out of nature as well. The park-builders engaged in their own kind of mythmaking, or artifice, when they defined these areas as pristine or "undisturbed" wildlands, places where past and present human effects on the ecology were negligible, where park visitors could enjoy a state of nature that was essentially no different from the way it had been before the coming of the white man. By declaring wilderness in this fashion, the park-builders provided the scientific and cultural justification for dispossessing Native peoples of their homelands.

This paper examines the creation of wilderness in Glacier Bay National Monument from 1879 to 1974, from the year of Glacier Bay's "discovery" by John Muir, to the year that the Park Service finally terminated the special seal hunting privilege in the national monument enjoyed by the Tlingit who lived in the nearby village of Hoonah. The Hoonah Tlingit were hardly passive in the process of creation; their persistent hunting and gathering activities posed a
recurring problem to the park-builders’ conception of wilderness in Glacier Bay, and they eventually mounted a legal challenge to it as well. In Alaska, the park-builders’ task was complicated by the fact that the United States government did not extinguish Indian title to the land until 1971. Extinguishment of Indian title, accomplished mainly by treaty and legislation, was practically over in the rest of the nation by the end of the nineteenth century. Only in Alaska did the federal government establish national parklands (Sitka in 1910, Mount McKinley in 1917, Katmai in 1918 and Glacier Bay in 1925) before extinguishing aboriginal title. But what is perhaps more interesting and significant about the history of Glacier Bay National Monument is the prominent role that scientists played in creating the illusion of pristine wilderness, in rationalizing why the Hoonah Tlingit had no place in this national park setting.

It is fitting to begin this story with John Muir, the “discoverer” of Glacier Bay and America’s premier preservationist at the end of the nineteenth century. In the fall of 1879, Muir canoed up southeast Alaska’s Inside Passage from Fort Wrangell to Glacier Bay, accompanied by the Reverend S. Hall Young and three Tlingit guides. On this first of four visits, Muir spent several days exploring the large fjord’s various inlets and tributary glaciers, deeply inspired by the treeless, glacier-polished terrain. A keen observer of glaciated landforms, Muir soon fathomed that this watery basin, rimmed by high mountain ranges and devoid of mature forest, was the scene of a phenomenally rapid and extensive glacial recession. The constant crack and rumble of ice breaking away from the unstable glacier fronts where they met tidewater was testimony to their continuing swift retreat. Muir, like many others who followed him, found in Glacier Bay a unique setting for contemplating how the land might have looked as it emerged from the Ice Ages.3

John Muir was what the nineteenth century called a “naturalist,” a man who artfully combined careful nature study in the scientific tradition with aesthetic nature appreciation in the romantic tradition. Muir held that scientific knowledge enriched one’s spiritual communion with nature. At the same time, almost paradoxically, Muir maintained that such knowledge was gained through very personal, sensate experience rather than by deductive reasoning and specialization. “Descriptive writing amounts to little more than Hurrah, here’s something! Come!” Muir protested. “Nature’s tables are spread and fires burning. You must go warm yourselves and
In Alaska, Muir wanted to see, touch, and assail living glaciers, whose imperceptible motion he firmly believed sculpted and furrowed the earth into spectacular landforms like those of his own beloved Yosemite Valley. To behold the awe-inspiring forces of nature, Muir believed, was to come as close to God as any man could. Here in Glacier Bay, cresting the wind-whipped waves in the dugout Tlingit canoe, Muir looked upon the surrounding mountains as reflections of a divine perfection. "After witnessing the unveiling of the majestic peaks and glaciers and their baptism in the downpouring sunbeams," he wrote, "it seems inconceivable that nature could have anything finer to show us." To Muir, this was a land reborn from the ice, pristine, free of the footprint of "Lord Man."

Muir found in his Indian companions a kind of devotional attitude toward nature that resonated warmly with his own animistic philosophy. "To the Indian mind all nature was instinct with deity," he wrote approvingly in his journal on a later visit to Glacier Bay. But he also took the conventional nineteenth century view that Indians were considerably far back on the continuum of savagery and civilization, and he was not above mocking the Indians' savage taste for wild meat. His missionary friend, Young, recalled how Muir, much to the annoyance of his Indian companions, would "take pleasure in rocking the canoe" whenever one of them tried to draw a bead on a deer or a duck. Furthermore, Muir found these Indians "afflicted" with a multitude of superstitions in much the way "all wild, or rather ignorant, peoples are sunk." Their exaggerated fear of natural phenomena seemed to make them as much the intruders, the exotics, in nature as he. Indeed, in writing his lyrical account of his first trip to Glacier Bay for a San Francisco newspaper soon afterwards, Muir tended to picture Indians in opposition to the natural world around them: huddled together in a circle of firefight, crowded inside a smoky hut at a seal hunting camp, fleeing the breaking icebergs in their cedar canoes. This contrasted with Muir's solitary wanderings on the bare slopes high above camp where, symbolically at least, he was closer than they to God and nature. Good literary technique though this may have been, Muir's writings constituted the first instance of artifice in the creation of the Glacier Bay wilderness.

The publicity that Muir gave to Glacier Bay opened an era in the 1880s and 1890s of sightseeing steamship excursions up Alaska's Inside Passage, highlighted by views of the enormous Muir Glacier in the east arm of Glacier Bay. The regular steamship service from Pacific Northwest ports also provided opportunities for scientific field studies. No less than five prominent scientists in the field of glacial
geology made inspections of the Muir Glacier between 1883 and 1899, while numerous articles featuring the Muir Glacier appeared in *National Geographic* and other popular magazines. Just as the tourist traffic to Glacier Bay facilitated scientific research, so too these writings added to the Muir Glacier's renown and attracted more tourists.10

The early glacier studies were still more important in establishing a scientific tradition in Glacier Bay. Each study contributed to a historical record of the rapidly changing landscape. This historical record steadily increased the value of Glacier Bay to future science. Forty years after Muir's first visit, plant ecologist William S. Cooper would write that Glacier Bay offered a unique setting for ecological study due to the rapidity with which plants were recolonizing vast areas laid bare by retreating glaciers, coupled with the "known history of glacier behavior," which made it possible to date various zones of regenerative plant growth.11 Thus Glacier Bay's scientific values derived from natural and historical conditions; early scientists did not simply find Glacier Bay to be a valuable place for field study—they made it one. Pioneering studies in the 1880s and 1890s laid the foundation for a vital scientific tradition in Glacier Bay in the twentieth century.

Dr. Cooper was the first scientist to recognize the potential significance of Glacier Bay to the field of ecology, and it was largely due to his efforts in the early 1920s that the place became a national monument. He first travelled to Alaska in 1914, where he combined his youthful interest in mountain climbing with the start of a search for an appropriate field laboratory, "a situation where vegetational change and development were proceeding so rapidly that they could be studied with fair completeness in the span of a lifetime."12 In Glacier Bay, Cooper laid out nine one-meter quadrats on the rocky soil at variable distances from the glacier termini, with the intention of resurveying each of them at five-year intervals. The area afforded a unique opportunity for studying the invasion of plants into new territory, "from pioneer to climax." Thanks to the "careful work of geologists," Cooper wrote, "we may lay our finger, so to speak, upon certain points where the length of exposure since the ice covering disappeared . . . is accurately known."13

Following his first repeat inspection of the nine quadrats in 1922, Cooper presented the early fruits of his long-range study to the annual meeting of the Ecological Society of America in Boston. Out of this discussion came the proposal to get Glacier Bay preserved as a national park or monument. Cooper agreed to chair a committee
and, at its next annual meeting, the society passed a resolution recommending the establishment of a national monument “for permanent scientific research and education, and for the use and enjoyment of the people.”14 (Another committee member, Robert F. Griggs, who had campaigned to establish Katmai National Monument a few years earlier, recommended the monument designation instead of a national park because the former could be done unilaterally by the executive while the latter required an act of Congress.) Garnering support from many scientific and conservation organizations, the Ecological Society's initiative eventually won the approval of President Calvin Coolidge, who proclaimed Glacier Bay National Monument on February 26, 1925.

What no one recognized or acknowledged in 1925 was that this victory for conservation was a defeat for the Tlingit of Hoonah, whose aboriginal territory and contemporary hunting and fishing grounds extended the full length of Glacier Bay. Neither Cooper and the conservation organizations who led the campaign for the monument nor anyone in the Department of the Interior thought about the Hoonah Tlingit and their seasonal use of the area for food gathering. A General Land Office report of August 1924 made fleeting reference to Indian allotments but that was all. The U.S. Bureau of Education, which had jurisdiction over Alaska Native affairs at the time, was not consulted and had nothing to say on the matter.

Not surprisingly, Cooper, the Ecological Society of America, and other natural science and conservation organizations summarily dismissed the Natives' role in the ecology of Glacier Bay even while they touted the scientific study of ecological succession as one of the major reasons for establishing the monument. The position taken by the American Association for the Advancement of Science was characteristic of the preservationist viewpoint. Noting the “undisturbed” condition of the coastal forest and regenerative plant growth around Glacier Bay, the AAAS declared that the highest purpose for this land was that it be “permanently preserved in an absolutely natural condition.”15 The scientists who were familiar with Glacier Bay knew that local Natives exploited its resources. They knew that aboriginal Indians had occupied the area for a long time—perhaps before the latest cycle of glacial advance and retreat.16 And more germane to the problem of ecological succession, they knew that Indians had been extracting resources from the area over the past one hundred years or more with increasingly potent technology and market incentives. Yet no one addressed the ecological implications of prohibiting or countenancing contemporary Native use of the area.
It fell to the National Park Service (NPS) to judge whether or not Native use of the area was compatible with the monument’s purpose. Park Service administration of the new area remained practically nil until the World War II era; however, from 1932 to 1939 the NPS was involved in discussions with the U.S. Forest Service and other agencies regarding the public demand for a sanctuary somewhere in southeast Alaska for the Alaskan brown bear, which many people feared was in danger of extinction. Two main proposals emerged: to establish a national park on Admiralty Island or to enlarge the existing national monument in Glacier Bay. Admiralty Island was renowned for its dense population of bears but it was also coveted by the Forest Service for the timber that would eventually be marketed to an envisioned pulpwood industry. To evaluate Glacier Bay’s suitability as a brown bear sanctuary, the NPS sent its top biologist, Joseph S. Dixon, there in 1932, and its chief forester, John D. Coffman, in 1938, each in company with the Forest Service’s head official in Alaska, B. F. Heintzleman. These officials worked a deal: the NPS would get a considerably enlarged Glacier Bay National Monument with the expectation that it would become a national park and be developed for tourism, while the Forest Service would retain Admiralty Island for use by the anticipated pulpwood industry. On April 18, 1939, President Roosevelt signed a proclamation that almost doubled the size of the monument and enclosed within its boundaries much more of the Hoonah Tlingit’s customary hunting and trapping territory. Glacier Bay National Monument was now larger than Yellowstone, second in size among national park areas only to Katmai National Monument in southwestern Alaska.17

The extension of the monument was a triumph for those in the NPS who were advocating a greater emphasis on biology in national park management. A small but influential number of scientists in the NPS, centered in the agency’s Wild Life Division in Berkeley, California, were promoting new approaches to management with a view to preserving wildlife habitat and whole ecosystems. The suggestion in the early 1930s that Glacier Bay National Monument might serve for the protection of the Alaskan brown bear gave them their first big opportunity to put their ideas into practice and the ecological guidelines, which they developed in the early 1930s, were clearly evident in the outcome. The aim of the extension, according to the joint report by Dixon and Coffman, was to make the monument “into a biotic unit representative of the flora and fauna from the bare glaciers to the mature forests of the seacoast, and with the special purpose in mind of preserving the Alaska bears.” Integral to
this vision was the idea that visitors would be able to view the wildlife under natural conditions: the NPS would build a number of boat docks so that visitors could land at selected observation points for “viewing the bears when they are attracted to the salmon streams by the salmon run or for observing and studying wildlife, vegetation, and glaciers.”

There was an incipient conflict here between the desire of the NPS to present tourists with an opportunity to observe bears at close range unmolested by people, and the customary use of these salmon streams by Hoonah Tlingit. Both Coffman and Dixon were well aware of Native use of the area. In 1932, Dixon had encountered a Native family catching and smoking sockeye salmon at Berg Bay and three Native families gathering wild strawberries and catching coho salmon on the Dundas River—both locations within the proposed new boundaries. In 1938, Coffman was informed by regional forester Heintzleman that natives of Hoonah trapped extensively in the area which he and Dixon proposed as an addition to the monument. Both men observed cabins and smokehouses at the mouths of numerous salmon streams. While listing at the end of their report several “Indian fish camps,” together with one trapper’s cabin, two fox farms (one under Forest Service permit, the other not), two white residences (both under Forest Service permit), and two unpatented mining claims, Coffman and Dixon did not venture to suggest how the Native property would be dealt with. The mere fact that the fish camps were placed at the end of a list titled “Other Land Occupancy,” this list itself following another of patented homesteads and approved Indian allotments titled, “Alienations,” indicated that the authors accorded customary Native use of the area low priority. The authors did declare that

certainly no trapping can be permitted within a national park or monument, and it will be necessary for the Indians to adjust their trapping areas elsewhere so as to make room for the few who may be excluded from areas used by them in the past within the proposed boundaries.

However, there was no discussion of this between the NPS and the people of Hoonah or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (which now had jurisdiction over Alaska Native affairs) prior to the president’s proclamation of April 18, 1939.

The low regard given to the Natives’ legal claims in the area had a parallel in the way Coffman and Dixon skewed or diminished the Natives’ place in the ecology of the area. They tended to regard the
fauna as indigenous and the Natives as relatively new arrivals—and itinerant at that. “The Indians come over from Hoonah in late summer and early fall to catch and dry salmon for winter,” Dixon remarked in his field notes taken at Point Carolus, on September 10, 1932. “This formerly was a good bear stream but is not so good now owing to the presence of Indians.” And later, at Excursion Inlet, he wrote: “There is a fine large stream coming into the head of the inlet but we found only old bear tracks. The presence of people here doubtless tends to keep the brown bears under cover.” Of course, Dixon knew perfectly well that the salmon stocks and the brown bear population within the Glacier Bay basin were themselves of fairly recent origin. In all likelihood, brown bears moved into the deglaciated area and began exploiting the salmon streams some time after their earliest use by the Hoonah Tlingit, who had an advantage over bears in their adaptation to sea travel. Insofar as the Natives and the bears were in competition for a limited number of salmon streams, Dixon formed an inaccurate picture in his mind when he perceived Native families encroaching on the brown Bears’ former domain.

Coffman and Dixon failed to see that in stressing patented or permitted inholdings over unpatented Native property, they were inadvertently creating a false impression of the human record in Glacier Bay. Their appraisal of the Native inhabitants’ legal standing in the area led Coffman and Dixon and other NPS officials to a false perception of the Tlingit place in nature. This, of course, was not new. John Muir had misrepresented the Natives as out of their natural element in Glacier Bay for, in Muir’s mind, Glacier Bay was an uninhabited wilderness. And the American Association for the Advancement of Science had dismissed the Native presence in the area before 1925 as of no ecological consequence because, much like Muir, the AAAS wanted Glacier Bay to be a pristine and undisturbed preserve for nature study. Now, for its part, the NPS embarked upon its own construction of the natural history of Glacier Bay with much the same purpose: to allow tourists an opportunity to have intimate encounters with wildlife in a natural setting, free of competition from human hunters. In doing so, the NPS began to treat the Hoonah Tlingit like the ecological equivalent of squatters.

In the summer of 1939, Mount McKinley National Park Superintendent Frank T. Been and NPS Chief Naturalist Earl A. Trager spent three weeks inspecting the enlarged national monument by boat, con-
tacting several white residents in the monument as well as the villagers in Hoonah, spreading word that federal law and NPS rules and regulations prohibited hunting and trapping in all national park areas. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) raised objections to the ban on behalf of the Natives of Hoonah; in the fall of 1939, senior officials of the two agencies agreed to a continuation of the Natives’ “normal use” of the wildlife in the monument. A flurry of radiograms in November and December between Superintendent Beeh, NPS Director Arno B. Cammerer, the school teacher in Hoonah, and the head of the BIA’s Juneau Area Office failed to pinpoint whether the privilege extended to Native trapping as well as seal hunting and gull egg collecting. Cammerer expected to send a Park Service biologist to Glacier Bay in the following field season; in the meantime, he wrote to Beeh, the arrangements were temporary “until a definite wildlife policy” could be formulated and “a substitute source of income” could be provided for the people of Hoonah.

The nation’s mobilization for war in 1940-41 and the ensuing deep cuts in the annual appropriations for national park administration prevented the agency from fielding a biologist in Glacier Bay until 1945. Nor did the NPS muster the funds for tourist development and in-site administration of the area until the 1950s. Yet the Park Service’s jurisdiction in Glacier Bay National Monument began to influence human affairs in the area more than the yearly visits by Superintendent Beeh in 1940-42 or the occasional amphibious patrols by the NPS custodian stationed at Sitka National Monument in 1943-45 might suggest. Local whites, resentful of the special hunting privilege accorded the people of Hoonah, sought and received sanction from NPS officials to take matters into their own hands. Hoonah Natives soon found their seasonal cabins smashed up and posted with “keep out” signs. On more than one occasion they were driven back to their boats by gunshots. According to one official, a Dundas Bay resident named Buck Harbeson “instilled a healthy respect for the law in many would-be poachers in his vicinity, and . . . acquired a reputation among the Indians of the Icy Straits area, that is legend.” The NPS custodian in Sitka was even more blunt. Harbeson had sent several parties of Natives “on their way at the point of a gun,” he wrote, adding, “If that is true, he is undoubtedly an asset to that area.” He was among the last white residents to leave the monument.

The NPS received additional help from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) wardens, who began patrolling the waters under cooperative agreement with the NPS in 1944. Sensitive to charges that Alaska game law enforcement discriminated against white Alaskans,
the FWS was even more zealous than the NPS in discouraging Native trappers from using the monument. Its head official in Juneau informed the people of Hoonah that possession of traps in the monument was illegal, even if stowed in a cabin or on a boat. In the winter of 1945-46, wardens arrested three Hoonah Indians for possession of traps in the monument, causing more outrage in Hoonah than any single incident relating to their dispossession from Glacier Bay.

Prompted in part by these local events, in part by regional developments involving Tlingit aboriginal claims to fishing and hunting grounds, the BIA insisted on a further round of discussions with the NPS to define Native privileges in Glacier Bay. The meetings, held in Washington, D.C., on December 10-11, 1946, yielded a more precise set of stipulations:

1. That the carrying of firearms for human protection be allowed under permit within the Monument during the berry-picking seasons, the procedure for the issuance of firearms to be worked out.

2. That the Natives be permitted to hunt for hair seals from the shore within a distance not to exceed 100 feet from the waterline.

3. That these modifications of the Park Service regulations shall continue in effect until 1950 at which time the Park Service and the Indian Service will review the Glacier Bay Monument conditions to determine whether the facts warrant a continuation of the practices or their modification.

Though the NPS assiduously maintained these privileges were temporary, the agreement came uncomfortably close to an acknowledgement of aboriginal rights in the area—a precedent whose legal and philosophical implications for national park management were not easy to contemplate. NPS Regional Director, O. A. Tomlinson, thought it an example of his boss's tendency to compromise on matters of principle. Tactfully, he wrote to Director Newton B. Drury: While we admittedly are not familiar with what pressure may have been exerted to bring this action about, we are frank to say that we believe the subject is worthy of further consideration. It is probably too late to rescind the decision without embarrassment, but we believe a thorough investigation of the situation should be made before the agreement is extended beyond 1950. Three of Tomlinson's staff—Regional Naturalist Dorr G. Yeager, Landscape Architect A. C. Kuehl, and Biologist Lowell Sumner—convinced him that allowing
firearms in the monument would endanger the seal population as well as the monument’s population of mountain goat and bear. Sumner and Kuehl each had some first-hand knowledge of the area and a reel of movie footage of the seal herds from brief trips in 1945 and 1946. Tomlinson directed Sumner to study the Native hunting privilege in Glacier Bay and report back the next summer.

Sumner’s cursory investigation and report of August 5, 1947 belied the NPS’s strong predisposition to ban Native hunting in the monument. Sumner’s few days in Glacier Bay in late June allowed only a brief appraisal of the effects of Native hunting and bird egg collecting on the animal populations in the monument, much less a reliable assessment of population sizes and trends of the various species that most concerned the NPS. The biologist probed into the inlets of the upper bay in search of hair seals, scanned the slopes of Mount Wright for mountain goats, and landed on North Marble Island to inspect bird colonies. His contacts with Hoonah seal hunters were minimal. His report contained a scant seven pages of text. Nevertheless, it was a strongly-worded condemnation of the present policy. Tomlinson gave Sumner’s report his full support. In a cover letter to Drury he wrote, “We have considered this question carefully and have completed a study of the biological problems involved.” Kuehl jotted on the file copy, “Excellent report.”

But the report was flawed in many aspects. Sumner did not limit himself to biological assessments but ranged into issues of cultural change and aboriginal hunting grounds. Even his biological assessments were weak, drawing conclusions about animal population trends based on ludicrously inadequate field data. “The National Park Service inspection party of 1947 made a special effort to count the seal population of Glacier Bay,” Sumner wrote, “but only a dozen were found, as compared with the scores observed at close range the preceding year. The animals were much wilder and more secretive than previously.” Not only did Sumner draw hasty conclusions from this “count,” but he implied that changes in the seals’ observed behaviour from one year to the next demonstrated increased hunting pressure. Sumner made similarly cavalier judgments when he inspected glaucous-winged gull rookeries on North Marble Island. “Great crowds of gulls stood at empty nests,” he wrote afterwards, “displaying the listlessness that characteristically settles upon a bird colony a few days after it has been robbed.” Again, noting that he had observed not one mountain goat where goats had been conspicuous in past years, he wrote: “it is likely that some seal-hunting natives, knowing themselves to be completely unsupervised, are in
the habit of adding the mountain goats of Mt. Wright, which borders Muir Inlet, to their meat supply. This judgment seems egregious in view of the fact that wolf predation was known to have increased in the area, a point that Sumner did not consider.

The omissions in Sumner’s report were as serious as his hasty conclusions. He offered no estimates of the number of seals killed in Glacier Bay by Native hunters in past years against which to compare the perceived hunting pressure of recent years. This was all the more surprising since Sumner and others in the NPS assumed that contemporary Native seal hunters were motivated primarily by the threedollar bounty paid by the territory for these predators of salmon. He might have easily checked the bounty records maintained by the Territorial Treasury Office in Juneau. These records indicated that approximately 7,000 to 13,000 seals had been killed and recorded each year since 1932, the majority of these in the First Judicial District, or southeast Alaska. Within that region, the highest concentrations of seal kills were reported from Icy and Chatham straits, near Hoonah. A seal hunter from Hoonah once told Superintendent Been that many kills reported from Icy Strait actually came from Glacier Bay. It seems probable that Hoonah Natives had taken thousands of seals in Glacier Bay over the past fifteen years—possibly a thousand or more each year—without causing a tangible decrease of the seal population. Yet Sumner’s report gave no indication of the effects of Native hunting on the Glacier Bay seal herds over time.

Sumner’s nine-day field study of the ecological consequences of Native hunting in Glacier Bay might have been compared with the NPS’s excellent two-year field study of the wolf in Mount McKinley National Park by Adolph Murie in 1939-41. In that study, Murie sought to situate the effects of wolf predation on Dall sheep within a complex web of other predator-prey relationships and historical and environmental factors influencing the park’s fauna. The marked contrast between these two investigations shows the bias with which NPS officials approached Native hunting—even from a supposedly objective biological perspective. The comparison also suggests that the inadequacy of the Glacier Bay study cannot be attributed solely to budgetary constraints.

The following summer, the NPS and the FWS tried to get the agreement rescinded but the BIA prevailed. In 1950, however, the NPS and the BIA both allowed the agreement to lapse. Agitation by the people of Hoonah led to a third meeting between the two agencies in 1954, this time involving Sitka National Monument’s Coordinating Superintendent Henry G. Schmidt and the BIA Juneau

The Northern Review 11 | Winter 1993
Area Office's Charles H. Jones. The two officials continued the discussion with Mayor Harry Douglas of Hoonah, where all agreed that the "continued use" of resources in Glacier Bay by the people of Hoonah was a "fair and logical solution to the problem, under present conditions." Except for some censusing by park rangers in the 1960s, Sumner's investigation in 1947 was the last time the NPS devoted funds to biological investigation of the hair seal in Glacier Bay until the mid-1970s. With the first assignment of a seasonal ranger to Glacier Bay in 1950, the NPS's approach to Native hunting changed inexorably from biological investigation to law enforcement.

Although Sumner's report did not give Director Drury the evidence that he needed to convince Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug to terminate the NPS-BIA agreement—evidence either of widespread abuse of the hunting privilege or impairment of the monument's resources—it was nevertheless an influential report within Park Service circles. Excerpted in a 1957 administrative history of the monument and again in a 1964 "Special Report Containing Information Required for Legislation to Redesignate Glacier Bay as a National Park," Sumner's report helped to fashion the Park Service's conception of the Glacier Bay wilderness. To Muir's myth of the undiscovered country, and to the ecologists' myth of the perfect outdoor laboratory, was added the Park Service's own myth of the Glacier Bay wilderness: the legend of the raid by bounty-hunting Indians who took advantage of the Park Service's pared-down, wartime administrative presence to kick in the door with their fraudulent aboriginal claim.

Though the bloom wore off the Park Service's commitment to biological management in the 1940s and 1950s, it returned in the 1960s. The most important policy initiative relating to biological management in this decade came from the report of the Leopold Committee in 1963. Commissioned by Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and chaired by University of California biologist A. Starker Leopold (the son of Aldo Leopold), the committee's report defined the nexus between wilderness preservation and ecological research. The Leopold Report recommended as a primary goal of park management that "biotic associations within each park be maintained or, where necessary, re-created as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man." Park managers could, if given adequate support for ecological research, strive to obtain "a reasonable illusion of primitive America."
Park Service were to succeed in this goal, it had to have a solid understanding of the ecological relationships at work in each area. This required a knowledge of the variety of plant and animal species found there; an understanding of the food chain, or trophic levels, that bound a particular ecological community; the physical boundaries of the ecological community, or ecosystem; and most difficult of all, a grasp of ecological change over time. Only then could park managers effectively prevent or compensate for human disturbance of the area's natural ecology. The Leopold Report provided park managers with a fairly coherent goal, but it was clear from the day that Secretary Udall made it Park Service policy that actually achieving effective biological management would be "vastly more difficult."  

The deglaciated basin around Glacier Bay held a biological community in the process of becoming. At the time of its earliest sighting by a white man—the benchmark suggested by the Leopold Committee for defining a pristine state of nature—it was covered by ice. During the entire period of European and American expansion in North America, Glacier Bay was undergoing its own invasion of colonizing plant and animal species. There was no climax community to restore; indeed, scientific interest in the ecological succession taking place in Glacier Bay was one of the reasons for the monument's existence. "Clearly," wrote park biologist Gregory P. Steveler and park naturalist Bruce Paige, "the biotic flux that contributes so importantly to the essence of the Monument should not be disturbed." They proposed a variation on the directive contained in the Leopold Report, redefining the goal of biological management in Glacier Bay to be "that the natural processes and systems operative during the period of discovery by white man be allowed (and, perhaps, in some cases, helped) to continue as if civilized man did not exist." Embedded in this statement was a paradox, an admission that the Park Service wilderness ideal was fundamentally a game of make-believe.

Within this framework, it was evident that protecting an ecosystem in a successional stage of development was at least as tricky as preserving an ecosystem in a climax stage. In the latter case, known climax community associations were thought to provide some ballast for ecosystem management. Theoretically, wilderness managers could measure their success by the health of plant and animal populations in the biological community. They could discover which species were exotics and needed to be suppressed and which species were missing and needed to be reintroduced. But in Glacier Bay,
where the process of ecological succession involved constant displacement of certain species by others, biologists had no comparable experience for helping them determine if an animal population's increase or decrease was natural or the result of human interference. Was the influx of coyotes at the extreme southern edge of the monument in the 1920s and 30s related to cattle grazing and homesteading, which tended to drive out wolves and brown bear, or was it related to the Sitka deer's recent expansion of its range into the area? Was a potential salmon stream devoid of salmon because it had been fished out, or because it had never been colonized? What was the hair seal's role in the evolving marine ecosystem and how vulnerable was it to human disturbances?

The ecology of the hair seal in Glacier Bay was not well known in the early 1960s. The monument staff observed numerous seals in the lower bay in the winter and early spring and recorded large congregations of seals near the glacier fronts in late spring and summer. It was thought that the seals migrated up-bay in the spring to feed on crustaceans and pup on the icebergs, returning to the lower bay in the summer to resume their main diet of finfish. The NPS had not yet made a reliable census but it was safe to say that the seal was the most abundant large mammal in the monument and an important part of the marine ecology.

Between May and November of 1963, two Hoonah Tlingit had a camp on Garforth Island, near the entrance to Muir Inlet, from which they harvested a reported total of 243 seals. In the spring of 1964, Chief Ranger David B. Butts took the ranger staff's single small patrol boat up-bay to see what remained of the camp. He was appalled to find a great many seals had been killed for their skins alone and left to rot on the beach. Over the next few months, Butts issued twenty permits to residents of Hoonah, including the two hunters of the previous year's big hunt. He began to worry about numbers, guessing the total population of seals in Glacier Bay might be no more than 800 to 1,000. "There are no bag limits, no closed season, and no closed area to protect this population," Butts wrote to the superintendent in Juneau. "Under present agreement this entire herd could be wiped out if the natives so desire."

Number assumed even greater significance after the Park Service tried to get the Secretary of the Interior to review the situation in 1964-65. The Washington office of the NPS instructed Superintendent Leone J. Mitchell to compile statistics on the numbers of permits issued, kills reported, bounties paid, and various other indices of hunting pressure on the seal population. Ranger Charles V. Janda
found these numbers disturbingly difficult to come by. For example, the permit system required hunters to report kills within thirty days to the chief ranger but the level of compliance was very low. Janda conceded, “there is absolutely nothing in our files which indicates any attempts on our part to enforce the regulations or at least remind the hunters of their responsibility.” Determining the amount of hunting pressure on the population was a matter of guesswork. Janda estimated that the total kill in Glacier Bay for the first half of 1965 had already reached 1,200. This was more than four times the reported kill of 291, and exceeded Butts’ total population estimate by 200-400 animals. Janda arrived at this estimate by extrapolating from state bounty records held in Juneau, which showed significant increases of seal harvests in 1963, 1964 and the first quarter of 1965. The bounty records, however, did not indicate where the seals had been taken.35

Meanwhile, on the basis of further rough counts of the hair seals, Janda raised the earlier population estimate more than eight-fold, to 7,000 to 8,000.48 Strictly in terms of a biological assessment, the higher population estimate significantly altered the picture of seal hunting. It now seemed doubtful that the annual harvest exceeded the number of surviving pups each year. Present hunting pressure, one staff report stated, was not “sufficiently intense to cause a noticeable change in the seal population.”47

Fortunately, from the Park Service’s standpoint, the higher population estimate not only put the seal out of danger of extermination but also elevated its status to the most abundant large mammal in the monument and a significant tourist attraction. Both Janda and Superintendent Robert E. Howe, who arrived in the thick of this controversy in April 1966, were very aware of the dismal impression seal hunting made on tourists. The long-awaited park lodge opened that summer and a tour-boat began providing day trips up-bay. Shooting seals had made the animals boat shy. “Passengers on the Park cruise boat express great interest and pleasure at seeing these animals,” a 1966 report on seal hunting stated. “They are visibly shaken when they learn that the Hoonah are allowed to kill them within the Monument boundaries.”48

Butts had raised similar objections in 1964. The presence of hunters had made the seals “much more wary of approaching boats.” As the seals now spooked off the ice whenever a boat came within earshot of them, it deprived “the bona fide visitor of the opportunity to observe the seal under natural conditions.” Of course, such “natural conditions” would themselves be a by-product of the Park Service’s creation of a wilderness, for Natives had been hunting seals
in Glacier Bay or its vicinity since time immemorial. Butts missed the irony. “Everywhere in the state,” he continued, “the seal is shot at and withdraws from the approaching boats and people. Glacier Bay should be the one place where it is protected as a member of the ecological community and enjoyed in its natural state.”

The ranger’s comments went to the nub of the Park Service’s traditional concept of nature. In this view, nature was the intricate interplay of all living things in the absence of human influences. To preserve nature, national parks had to insulate these delicate ecological relationships from human disturbance. Though human beings were present in national parks as visitors, theoretically their influence was benign: they neither introduced nor removed anything from the food chain. Their use of the area was “non-consumptive.”

When their investigation of the effects of hunting on the seal population led to conclusions that were other than what they desired, Howe and Janda shifted their attention to the effects of hunting on seal behaviour and wildlife viewing. “Although it is unlikely that the limited seal hunting in Glacier Bay National Monument has any effect on the overall population,” they wrote,

we are greatly concerned as to the effect the hunting has on the park visitors [sic] opportunity to see seal. The harassment and killing of these animals has made it impossible to get close to them on the ice flows [sic].

Like Butts, they wanted tamer animals. Both having served for several years in Yellowstone National Park prior to their assignment to Glacier Bay, Howe and Janda believed that Glacier Bay had the potential to join Yellowstone as one of the nation’s great wildlife parks. “The great wildlife viewing opportunities in the well known parks in the System are the results of protection from hunting and where necessary, closely supervised control problems,” they noted. They acknowledged that national park management could change animal behavior insofar as animals could become habituated to tourists and lose their natural fear of human beings. Yet, inadvertently perhaps, they turned the table on the hunter. They equated tame animals with natural conditions and hunters with unnatural conditions. The inversion may have seemed like a minor point to NPS officials concerned with preserving nature for the enjoyment of the American public but it was a bitter irony for the area’s indigenous people. In effect, it created the illusion that native hunters were interlopers in Glacier Bay.

NPS officials impugned the hunter’s relationship to Glacier Bay seals in another way that was even more damaging. When an upturn
in the hide market in 1963-65 led a handful of Hoonah Natives to start taking a hundred or more seals apiece in Glacier Bay each season, NPS officials assumed that these were a new class of Native seal hunter because they were oriented to the market rather than the village subsistence economy. The NPS perceived a discontinuity between this kind of seal hunting and the aboriginal seal hunting practices of the hunter’s forebears. This alleged discontinuity, NPS officials insisted, ought to disqualify the market hunter from hunting in the monument. They saw the market hunter as a sort of fallen Indian. Chief Ranger Butts wrote, “If they [the seals] were used for domestic purposes such as hide for clothing and meat for food I might feel differently.” Ranger Janda, filling out an incident report on Hoonah Native Kenneth Schoonover for taking 210 hair seals from the monument without a permit in February 1969, entered Schoonover’s race as “Caucasian—claims Thlingit Lineage.” To Superintendent Howe, the hide hunters who came into the bay in large fishing boats with skiffs in tow “were not real Indians.” These NPS officials overlooked the fact that Natives had been market hunting as well as subsistence hunting for generations.

That no credible distinction between subsistence and market hunters really existed is shown by the fact that the first two Native hunters to exploit the higher prices paid for hides in 1963 were George Dalton and James Austin, two longtime hunters whom the NPS would later describe as the only remaining true subsistence hunters still using monument waters. According to a writer for Alaska Sportsman, who invited the two seal hunters aboard his cruiser one day, Dalton and Austin were saving some of the hair seal hides to make moccasins and selling others to a fur dealer. They distributed seal oil to friends and kin in Hoonah and sold some of the carcasses to crab fishermen for crab bait. By the end of the season they had also collected $729 in bounty payments.

Dalton and Austin harvested these seals in the usual manner. They hunted the seals from a skiff and from the shore, shooting them in the head in such a way that their jaws stayed shut; otherwise a shot seal had a tendency to open its mouth, inhale a lot of water and sink before hunter could get to it. They skinned the seals on the beach and what carcasses they could not use, they left to rot. When Butts found the putrefying remains of their work the following spring he was appalled by the waste, the gore, and the stench. He was even more dismayed when another seal hunter, Jimmy Martin, told him that he had shot 161 seals and had lost 40 percent to sinking. To Martin, it was a test of a hunter’s proficiency to secure as large a percentage of
his kills as possible; to Butts, it was a travesty to kill so many animals without being able to retrieve them all. "This type of shooting has no place in a National Monument," Butts wrote the superintendent.  

Just as the purpose and intensity of seal hunting disturbed NPS officials, so too did the technology that was now at the seal hunter's disposal. In early April 1964, a converted 110-foot submarine chaser came into Bartlett Cove to wait out a storm. The white crew was seal hunting and inquired about the monument boundaries along the outer coast. The next day, after the submarine chaser had left, four Hoonah Tlingit docked in Bartlett Cove to obtain permits. Asked what they knew about the submarine chaser, they said that the crew had been trying to hire "sharpshooters" in Hoonah. While it was unclear whether the crew's intent was to gain access to Glacier Bay seals, Butts thought the NPS had no legal recourse to stop such a plan. "So long as they are natives and have a permit they can operate under any subsidy they can work up," Butts wrote Superintendent Mitchell. "One boat such as this 110 foot one could keep a sizable crew of hunters in the Monument and really slaughter the seal."  

Two years later in 1966, Superintendent Howe again raised the specter of a "mother ship" employing Hoonah Tlingit with hunting permits. "Why no one had taken advantage of this loophole is surprising to all of us," he wrote. NPS officials had become so ardent in defending Glacier Bay wilderness that they now resorted to the tactic of attacking Native activities that had never actually taken place.  

Some time later—no record of the incident is contained in the park's files—some Hoonah Tlingit entered Glacier Bay on Willie Marks' fishing boat New Annie with more than a dozen skiffs in tow. This was not quite the factory ship with compressed-air skinning devices that the monument staff feared, but the enterprise still struck the superintendent as morally wrong and illegal. NPS rangers intercepted the boat, boarded it, and confiscated the Natives' rifles for evidence. The incident became something of a symbol for both points of view: a symbol of Native avarice to the NPS, a symbol of NPS belligerence to the Natives. Hoonah Tlingit were outraged but also cowed by the incident. Most of them would not concede that the mission of the New Annie was an aberration from subsistence seal hunting.  

Conclusion
Some twenty years after the NPS unilaterally terminated the Hoonah Tlingit's hunting privilege in Glacier Bay, the process of creating a wilderness continued, with the adoption in 1991 of park fishing regulations that would phase out commercial fishing use of all park waters by 1997. An executive summary written in 1989 in anticipation of this action provided the following justification:

Glacier Bay National Park has the potential for becoming perhaps the foremost marine sanctuary where the aquatic organisms are afforded full protection given terrestrial species. As such, the park stands to serve as a natural terrestrial and marine laboratory such as Yellowstone. This facet is increasingly important from local, regional, and coastal perspectives as land and fisheries managers require stable benchmarks from which to compare disturbed ecosystems. Thus, Glacier Bay National Park is world renowned for its wilderness character and the opportunity for scientific study of ecosystem processes with few consumptive uses or other disturbances by man.63

This is the artifice of wilderness preservation: the pretence that wilderness is found, not created. In this case the NPS acknowledged that “full protection” must be instituted to make the area “perhaps the foremost marine sanctuary.” But it masked this reality with a declaration of the area’s “intrinsic value.” A needed sense of the history of human involvement in the ecosystem falls away and is replaced by a concept of wilderness that is timeless and immutable. Yet when the history of human involvement in the environment is closely examined, the idea cannot hold up. We need to re-examine our premises. Limited consumptive uses by indigenous peoples may be more compatible with the preservation of wilderness environments than we are inclined to believe. It is indeed a strange state of affairs that exists in Glacier Bay today when the law still permits the extraction of millions of pounds of fish from park waters by commercial trollers and long-liners, yet prohibits comparatively minor subsistence harvests of those same resources by the indigenous people of Hoonah.

Theodore R. Catton is writing an administrative history of Mount Rainier National Park and completing his PhD in environmental history at the University of Washington.

Acknowledgements

This paper derives from an administrative history of Glacier Bay National
Park and Preserve produced for the U.S. National Park Service and from a paper written for Professor Richard White's western history seminar at the University of Washington and revised for a caucus on World History and the Environment at the University of Victoria. I thank Richard White for his painstaking criticism in the seminar and Professor Ralph Crozier for organizing a stimulating caucus. I thank Professor John Findlay for his generous help with the administrative history. I thank the National Park Service for its support in making agency files available and reviewing earlier drafts of this material. In particular I thank Regional Historian Sandra Faulkner, Park Superintendent Marvin Jensen, and Sociologist Darryl Johnson of the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, College of Forest Resources, University of Washington. The views expressed here are my own and should not be attributed to the National Park Service.

Endnotes


2. John Muir, "The Discovery of Glacier Bay," *The Century Magazine*, vol. 28 (June 1895). When Captain George Vancouver charted this part of Alaska's coastline in 1794 he recorded a wall of glacier ice across the entire entrance to the bay. The glacier subsequently receded approximately thirty miles over the next eighty years, exposing the largest bay in southeast Alaska. But Muir and Young were not the first non-Indians to enter Glacier Bay. In 1868, the US Revenue Steamer *Wayanda*, under the command of John W. White, navigated Icy Strait and Glacier Bay with the guidance of a Russian pilot, Cadin. Chief Engineer J. A. Doyle recounted the crew's harrowing experience in Glacier Bay thirty-five years later for the Alaska Boundary Tribunal. "While in Glacier Bay the ship at one time got aground and was for a time in considerable danger from large masses of ice which were floating by. Before the tide arose to release us from our predicament a number of Indian canoes came in sight, and to illustrate to the natives the fact that the ship could take care of herself, although temporarily unable to move, a number of shells were fired from the 24-pounder howitzers at the floating icebergs. The bursting of the shells appeared to frighten the people in the canoes, and certainly greatly impressed the two native chiefs whom we had taken on board for passage to Sitka." US Senate, *Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal*, vol. 2, 58th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Doc. No. 162, 1904, pp 474-75. In 1877, Lieutenant C. E. S. Wood, on leave from his ship at Sitka, went goat hunting in the Saint Elias Mountains, crossed into the
Glacier Bay basin, and hired some Indian seal hunters to transport him back to Sitka by canoe. C. E. S. Wood, "Among the Thlinkits in Alaska," *The Century Magazine*, vol. 24, no. 3 (July 1882), pp 323-339. The bay remained virtually unknown to the outside world until 1879.


15. Burton E. Livingston to Governor of Alaska," February 7, 1925, National Archives—Alaska Region (hereafter cited as NAAR), National Archives Microfilm Publication M-939, General Correspondence of the Alaskan Territorial Governor, 1909-1958, roll 124, file 42.

16. Cooper himself reconstructed what kind of forest the basin supported before the last cycle of glacial advance and retreat, which began some
400 to 800 years ago. A Hoonah Tlingit clan legend tells of the forced abandonment of the valley as the glacier advanced.

17. J. D. Coffman to Director (NPS), September 14, 1938 and Joseph S. Dixon to Regional Director, April 6, 1939, National Archives-Pacific Sierra Region (hereafter cited as NAPSR), RG 79, Western Region, Central Classified Files, box 294, file 602.


19. Ibid., p. 2C.


22. William Zimmerman, Jr. to Claude M. Hirst, July 7, 1939 and Charles M. Hawkesworth to Frank T. Been, November 29, 1939, NAAR, RG 754, Alaska Reindeer Service, box 64, file Hunting, Fishing, and Fur Farming; Arno B. Cammerer to Frank T. Been, December 1, 1939, National Archives (hereafter cited as NA), RG 79, CCF, box 2228, file 208.06. Both quotations are in Cammerer to Been.

23. Been quotes his instructions to Dundas Bay resident William Horsman in Frank T. Been to Director, January 9, 1940, NAPSR, RG 79, Western Region, CCF, box 294, file 610. Local white attitudes and intentions are described in William Horsman to Frank T. Been, May 8, 1940, same file; and Horace Ibach to Frank T. Been January 9, 1940, NA, RG 79, CCF, box 2228, file 208.06.

24. These events went unreported for several years and were discussed in William E. Warne to Acting Commissioner (BIA), Director (Division of Territories and Island Possessions), Director (Fish and Wildlife Service), and Director (NFS), June 11, 1948, and Grant H. Pearson to Regional Director, September 16, 1948, NAPSR, RG 79, Western Region, CCF, box 293, file 208.


26. Grant Pearson to Regional Director, September 16, 1948, ibid., box 293, file 208.

27. Ironically, Harbeson was not too law-abiding himself. He told Been and Trager in 1939 that he had trapped in the area for several years, yet his name does not appear on a list of trapping permit applicants in the Icy Strait area for 1937-38. Moreover, on Been’s return visit in
1940 Harbeson avoided him, and Been found evidence at Harbeson’s cabin that he had been poaching bears. Frank T. Been field notes, July 28, 1940, Denali National Park and Preserve, William E. Brown historical files. It must be noted that the departure of whites from the monument did not leave the place uninhabited. The patented homestead lands that occupied an alluvial outwash plain at the opening of Glacier Bay mostly changed hands but remained in private ownership. This marginal community, known as Gustavus, proved to be more enduring than the NPS had envisioned, owing to the construction of an airfield on this level section during World War II and its use by the Civil Aeronautics Administration after the war. The area around Gustavus was excluded from the monument in 1955.

28. Don C. Foster to Secretary Ickes, January 29, 1946 and Don C. Foster to William Zimmerman, Jr., January 30, 1946, NAAR, RG 75, Juneau Area Office, General Subject Correspondence, box 37, file 920 Hunting, Fishing, and Fur Farming.


32. O. A. Tomlinson to Newton D. Drury, August 13, 1947, ibid.


34. Hoonah Native Frank Sinclair’s statement on wolves is of interest: “The coyotes and wolves have killed all of the foxes and are killing the mountain goats. There are very few mountain goats left. In two cases during the last few years we have seen wolves and coyotes kill twelve mountain goats at one time and two mountain goats at another time. The wolves spot the mountain goats on the ridge and wait for them to come up the ridge and push them over the steep cliffs from the side, and then go down below to feed on their carcasses.” September 20, 1946, NA, RG 79, CCF, box 2228, file 208.06, part 1. Investigation into this unusual ecological relationship in a later period resulted in James L. Fox and Gregory P. Steveler, “Wolf Predation on Mountain Goats in Southeastern Alaska,” Journal of Mammalogy, vol. 67, no. 1 (February 1986), pp 192-195.

35. Amounts Expended for Bounty on Hair Seals, NAAR, RG 75, Juneau Area Office, General Subject Correspondence, box 42, file 923.2 Hair Seal No. 1; Frank T. Been field notes, July 25 and 30, 1940, Denali National Park and Preserve, William H. Brown historical files.

37. Superintendent to Regional Director, March 1, 1954, GLBA, administrative files, file N1619.


42. Speculation on these issues is found in the Annual Wildlife Reports, GLBA, administrative files, file N2621.

43. Superintendent to Director, August 13, 1962 and June 6, 1963, Sitka National Historic Park (hereafter cited as SITK), historical files, file Monthly Narrative Reports.

44. David B. Butts to Superintendent, March 27, 1964 and June 3, 1964, GLBA, administrative files, file N1619.


46. Seal Hunting—Glacier Bay [1966], *ibid*.

47. *Ibid*.


49. David B. Butts to Superintendent, March 27, 1964, GLBA, administrative files, file N1619.


51. Seal Hunting—Glacier Bay [1966], GLBA, administrative files, file N1619.

52. In recent years some NPS officials have raised the same point with

53. David B. Butts to Superintendent, March 27, 1964, GLBA, administrative files, file N1619.


58. Hair Seal Bounty to Persons Claiming Residence Hoonah, Alaska—Calendar Year 1963, GLBA, admin. files, file N1619.


60. David B. Butts to Superintendent, April 7, 1964, administrative files, file N1619.


recording in author’s possession, April 10, 1992; Amy Marvin and Mary Rudolph interview by author, tape recording in author’s possession, April 10, 1992. None of these sources could establish a firm date. Bosworth places the incident in the early 1970s, Schroeder and Kookesh in 1966 or 1967. It is also not clear on what grounds the NPS confiscated the Natives’ guns.

63. Commercial Fishing Executive Summary, July 12, 1989, GLBA, active files, file N1625.